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I. INTRODUCTION
[A] domestic producer subjected to unfairly priced imports from several
sources is like a man assaulted by three assailants in a dark alley-he
doesn't know which one cut his arm and which one put the lump on his
head, all he knows is that the three combined injured him.'
United States manufacturers2 have sometimes found themselves un-
able to identify which unfair import competitors have injured their in-
dustries when sources of unfair competition exist in more than one
country. These manufacturers have had some redress from unfair trade
available to them through various federal trade laws, including, inter
alia, the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Until recently, how-
ever, these laws have largely addressed unfair trade competition coming
from a single foreign country source at a time; they have not, however,
addressed the "hammering effect"' of unfair competition from many
sources operating in the market at once or sequentially.
The International Trade Commission ("Commission") is the federal
agency responsible for determining injury to domestic industries under
these trade laws. Over the years the Commission has developed an ana-
lytic approach for dealing with multiple-source injury to domestic indus-
tries. This approach is known as "cumulation." When the Commission
I Aminoacetic Acid (Glycine) from France, TC Pub. 313, Inv. No. AA1921-61, at 10 (Feb.
1970).
2 In fact, one representative of the United States steel industry phrased the same image in a
more dramatic fashion in recent congressional hearings: "[D]eath by one or one hundred blows is
equally fatal." Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, Part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1983) (statement of
Dr. Adolph J. Lena, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Specialty Steel Industry of the
United States)[hereinafter Options to Improve, Part 1].
3 Portland Gray Cement from Portugal, TC Pub. 37, Inv. No. AA1921-22, at 37 (Oct. 1961).
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applies this approach, it combines import statistics from all the cumu-
lated sources and assesses their combined impact upon the domestic in-
dustry for purposes of determining whether the domestic industry has
been injured. When foreign competition is considered en masse, its im-
pact appears more significant, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
Commission will make an affirmative injury determination.
A version of this cumulation doctrine was recently carried over
from administrative practice into statutory law to become part of the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 ("1984 Act" or "Act").4 Prior to passage
of the 1984 Act, the Commission exercised its discretion in deciding
whether to cumulate statistics from different sources in an injury investi-
gation under the unfair trade laws. Incorporation of the cumulation pro-
vision into the Act has significantly altered Commission practice:
cumulative analysis is now mandatory in certain circumstances.
This new law and practice relating to the Commission's use of cu-
mulation forms the subject of this Article. After a short review of the
existing laws and procedures in the unfair trade area, this Article reviews
cumulation practices adopted by the Commission both before and after
the effective date of the 1984 Act.5 The language of the 1984 Act is
construed emphasizing the relevant legislative history. Problems which
arise in interpreting the most ambiguous criterion for employing cumula-
tion-that, to be cumulated, the imports must be "subject to investiga-
tion" 6-- is analyzed. This Article then interprets this criterion in ways
appropriate to the current statute, United States international commit-
ments, and the purposes of laws regulating unfair imports. The propriety
of using a de minimis analysis is examined in light of the new statute.
Finally, this Article identifies appropriate occasions for the Commission
to cumulate.
II. UNFAIR IMPORT TRADE LAWS
A number of practices in international trade are recognized as being
unfair or injurious methods of competition against which a nation may
act in order to protect its own industries. The two most important prac-
tices, for purposes of this Article, are dumping and providing bounties or
grants.
4 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 612(a)(2)(A)(iv), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1982 & Supp.
1985). See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for the wording of the new provision. The
legislative history of the Trade and Tariff Act is reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEvs 4910.
5 The cumulation provision of the 1984 Act became effective for petitions filed after Oct. 30,
1984. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 626(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
6 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv).
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Dumping is the preferential pricing of a product in an export market
lower than in the home market, or lower than cost, typically in order to
capture a market share for future profits.7 The existence of such prefer-
ential pricing is determined by certain complex statutory calculations
made by the Department of Commerce. These calculations produce a
"dumping margin," which is the margin of underselling in the United
States as compared to the home market or other comparison price. Any
sales made with benefit of a dumping margin are said to be made at "less
than fair value" ("LTFV").
Bounties and grants are benefits which a government 8 bestows upon
an industry or a company in order to promote the competitiveness of that
industry or company or accomplish some other policy. Bounties or
grants which are used for domestic purposes and which produce purely
domestic effects, are unobjectionable. When the effects of that increased
competitiveness extend to another country's marketplace, however, the
competition is deemed unfair.
Multilateral trade agreements and United States law have created
remedies for each of these unfair methods of competition. The United
States or any other importing country may impose extra duties upon the
incoming unfairly traded merchandise. Those duties are carefully calcu-
lated to equal the amount of the unfair benefit gained, whether it be the
dumping margin or the government grant. In this way, the importing
country can create fairness in the domestic marketplace that would
otherwise be absent by reason of the foreign economic decisions.
Certain limitations to this basic remedial scheme exist under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").9 The first of these
limitations is that no remedial duties under the antidumping law or coun-
tervailing duty laws may be imposed unless a domestic industry is first
found to be materially injured or threatened with material injury by rea-
son of the unfairly traded imports.1o United States law is consistent with
7 Because it is only the injury phase of unfair import investigations that is relevant to this
Article, summaries of the unfair practices themselves will necessarily be kept brief and general.
8 It is theoretically possible for a countervailing duty case to be based upon a grant of a subsidy
by a private party, but no investigation concerning such an allegation has come to the writer's atten-
tion. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b).
9 Openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Al1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. GATT
has never been ratified by the United States Senate, and essentially operates as an executive
agreement.
1O Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 6, 4, 31 U.S.T. 513, 528, T.I.A.S. No. 9619
(countervailing duties)(entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980)[hereinafter Agreement on Articles VI,
XVI and XXIII]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 3, 4, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 4927, T.I.A.S. No. 9650, (antidumping du-
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GATT, as it also requires a causal link between the unfairly traded im-
ports and the material injury to the domestic industry before remedial
measures may be taken.'I Antidumping duties may be imposed only af-
ter a finding of LTFV imports and a finding that such imports caused
material injury to a domestic industry." Countervailing duties against
GATT countries 13 may be imposed only after both a finding of subsi-
dized imports and a finding that such imports caused material injury to a
domestic industry. "
A second GATT requirement is that no investigation of unfair im-
port practice may proceed without a reasonable basis for claiming that
such activity is taking place and causing injury. 5 A parallel provision in
United States law requires that "preliminary determinations" be made to
ascertain whether there is a "reasonable indication" that the unfair prac-
tice is taking place and a "reasonable indication" that a domestic indus-
try is being injured or threatened with injury.' 6 These requirements in
United States law were enacted in direct response to the GATT
requirement. '
7
An affirmative determination during a final injury investigation re-
ties)(entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980)[hereinafter Apr. 12 Agreement on Implementation]. See
also Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (International Anti-Dumping Code)[hereinafter
June 30 Agreement on Implementation]; Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1767, 1769-70, T.I.A.S. No.
3930, 278 U.N.T.S. 168, 170-72 (countervailing and antidumping duties)[hereinafter Protocol
Amending the Preamble].
11 Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to implement the GAIT Subsidies and
Antidumping Codes. 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1979);
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
381, 401-02.
12 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (part of Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984); see Gifford-
Hill Cement Co. v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 577, 579 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985); American Spring
Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd sub nom. Armco,
Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
13 This also applies to countries which have assumed substantially equivalent obligations. See 19
U.S.C. § 1671(b).
14 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (part of Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984).
15 See Agreement on Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra note 10, at 528; Apr. 12 Agreement on
Implementation, supra note 10, at 4927; June 30 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 10, at
4351, 4353; Protocol Amending the Preamble, supra note 10, 8 U.S.T. at 1769-70, 278 U.N.T.S. at
170-72.
16 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (preliminary determinations in antidumping investigations); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671b (preliminary determinations in countervailing duty investigations). See generally Horlick,
Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 58 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 828 (1983-84).
17 H.R. REP. No. 317, supra, note 11, at 60-61.
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quires a finding of "material injury," "threat of material injury," or "ma-
terial retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry."' 8 An
affirmative finding during a preliminary injury investigation requires "a
reasonable indication" of any of the foregoing,' 9 which is an easier test to
satisfy. "Material injury" is defined under both GATT and United
States law as harm that is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimpor-
tant, in view of factors such as the volume of subject imports, the effect of
subject imports upon domestic prices for like goods, and the impact of
subject imports upon domestic producers of like goods.2" Both an-
tidumping law and countervailing duty law arise under Title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930,1 where these injury standards appear in the common
definitional provisions.22 It is also within such common definitions that
the new provision on cumulation appears.2 3
Not all countries in the world are signatories of GATT. Although
the United States is under no international obligation to afford nonsig-
natories the injury test and preliminary determination screening device
described above, it has, with one exception, incorporated these tests into
various provisions of domestic law. This one exception is with respect to
the injury test under countervailing duty law. This exception is embod-
ied in § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ("§ 303 ").24
Under § 303, if the subsidized article entering the United States
originates from a country that is not a member of GATT, duties may be
imposed following the Commerce Department finding of a subsidy, with-
out any Commission determination that a domestic industry has been
injured. 25 However, if the subsidized article normally enters the United
States free of duty and the United States has obliged itself, by treaty or
otherwise, to afford imports from that country an injury test in counter-
vailing duty investigations, then the Commission must find injury under
Title VII before any compensatory duties may be imposed.26 This struc-
18 Trade Agreement Act of 1979 § 705(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(1)(countervailing duty inves-
tigations); Trade Agreement Act of 1979 § 735(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1)(antidumping
investigations).
19 Trade Agreement Act of 1979 § 703(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(countervailing duty investiga-
tions); Trade Agreement Act of 1979 § 733(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a)(antidumping investigations).
20 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7).
21 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-76.
22 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7).
23 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv).
24 19 U.S.C. § 1303.
25 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1)(b).
26 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2). Israel is an example of a non-GATT country to which the United
States has undertaken to afford an injury test in a countervailing duty investigation of duty-free
imports. Potassium Chloride from Israel, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,001 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigations).
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ture may seem odd when viewed in conjunction with the other counter-
vailing law, 7 but it exists for historical reasons.2 8 If a violationof § 303
is found, countervailing duties are imposed.
III. THE HISTORY OF CUMULATION
A. Cumulation before the 1984 Act
Prior to passage of the 1984 Act, cumulation of import statistics was
discretionary with the Commission. The first appearance of cumulation
in a Commission determination occurred in 1968.29 During most of the
time between 1968 and the effective date of the 1984 Act,30 cumulation
was used solely to test injury in antidumping cases.31 The Commission
would cumulate statistics from allegedly dumped imports with those
from other allegedly dumped imports to determine whether a domestic
industry had been injured. The issue of cumulation arose in a few coun-
tervailing duty investigations, but the Commission refused to cumulate in
those investigations.3" Nor was cumulation used to combine the statis-
tics for more than one type of unfair trade practice at a time.33
To determine whether cumulation was appropriate in a given case,
the Commission developed a standard market analysis approach. Au-
thority for this approach derived from the legislative history of the Trade
Act of 1974,34 which instructed the Commission to consider "the factors
and conditions of trade affecting the market in these goods.",3 5 The par-
27 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)-(f). See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
28 Section 303 of the TariffAct of 1930 embodies the pre-1979 United States countervailing duty
law under which an injury test was granted only with respect to duty-free imports from GATT
countries. Although this restrictive use of an injury test is contrary to Article VI of GATT, it has
been grandfathered in under the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, l(b), 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. The
1979 Act did not altogether preempt or repeal § 303. Section 701(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c).
29 Pig Iron from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the U.S.S.R., T.C. Pub. 265, Inv.
Nos. AA1921-52 to -55, at 24-25 (Sept. 1968).
30 October 30, 1984. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
31 See USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-F-186 (June 1981) (LEXIS, Itrade library,
Gcm file) [hereinafter GC-F-186]; USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-E-337 (Dec. 1981)
(LEXIS, Itrade Library, Gcm file) [hereinafter GC-E-337].
32 E.g., Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate from Romania, Belgium, and Brazil, USITC Pub. 1208,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-83, -84 (Prelim.)(Jan. 1982); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet from France, USITC
Pub. 1206, Inv. No. 701-TA-85 (Prelim.)(Jan. 1982); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate from Romania,
USITC Pub. 1207, Inv. No. 731-TA-51 (Prelim.)(Jan. 1982). See GC-E-337, supra note 31, at n.3.
33 See infra text accompanying notes 122-29.
34 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487.
35 According to the Senate report:
Under consistent practice ... the Commission has considered the combined impact of less-than-
fair-value imports in making injury determinations when the facts and economic conditions so
warrant. Such result does not follow as a matter of law; it follows, on a case by case basis, only
when the factors and conditions of trade show its relevance to the determination of the injury.
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ticular factors and conditions the Commission took into account in its
market analysis were the:
1) volume of subject imports;
2) trend of import volume;
3) fungibility of imports;
4) competition in the market for the same end users;
5) common channels of distribution;
6) pricing similarity;
7) simultaneous impact; and
8) coordinated action by the importers. 6
B. Cumulation under the 1984 Act
The 1984 Act replaced the Commission's discretion with a statutory
standard for cumulating in a given investigation. The language of the
Act's cumulation provision is:
For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii), 3 7 the Commission shall cumulatively
assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries of like
products subject to investigation if such imports compete with each other
and with like products of the domestic industry in the United States
S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 180, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7186, 7187 (emphasis added).
36 Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Brazil and Spain, USITC Pub. 1569, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-220 (Prelim.), 731-TA-197, -198 (Prelim.) 11 n.31 (Aug. 1984); Certain Steel Products
from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom
and West Germany, USITC Pub. 1221, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-86 to -144, -146, -147 (Prelim.), 731-TA-
53 to -86 (Prelim.), vol. 1, at 14-15, 64-67, 95, 127-29 (1982).
37 The reference is to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(7)(C)(i) and (ii). In context, those provisions are as
follows:
(B) Volume and consequent impact.
In making its determinations under sections 1671b(a) [preliminary injury determinations in
countervailing duty investigations], 1671d(b) [final injury determinations in countervailing duty
investigations], 1673b(a) [preliminary injury determinations in antidumping duty investiga-
tions], and 1673d(b) [final injury investigations in antidumping duty investigations], the Com-
mission shall consider, among other factors -
(i) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation,
(ii) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for like prod-
ucts, and
(iii) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like products.
(C) Evaluation of volume and of price effects. For purposes of subparagraph (B)-
(i) Volume. In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the Commission shall
consider whether the volume of imports of the merchandise, or any increase in that volume,
either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States, is signifi-
cant.
(ii) Price. In evaluating the effect of imports of such merchandise on prices, the Commis-
sion shall consider whether -
(I) there has been significant price undercutting by the imported merchandise as
compared with the price of like products of the United States, and
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a signifi-
cant degree or prevents price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant
degree.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(7)(B)-(C).
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market.38
Thus, the Commission must now consider two criteria in deciding
whether to cumulate import statistics in a given investigation.39 First,
the imports to be cumulated must compete with each other and with the
domestic product they allegedly injure. Second, the imports to be cumu-
lated must all be "subject to investigation." Precisely what this latter
requirement entails is the subject of the greater part of this Article.40
Shortly after passage of the 1984 Act, the Commission's legal staff
began briefing the Commissioners on the legal requirements of the new
Act. In so doing, the staff set forth the criteria for cumulation they
found in the Act. The staff's criteria differ from the two criteria set forth
above in that a third element is included. According to the Commission
staff, for imports to be cumulated, they must compete with each other
and with the like domestic product, they must be "subject to investiga-
tion," and they must be "reasonably coincident" in marketing.4t The
staff purportedly derived this third requirement from the language of the
statute and from its legislative history.42
However, neither the language of the statute nor its legislative his-
tory support this third element. Language requiring that the imports to
be cumulated be reasonably coincident was contained in the original
House bill,43 but was later cut in the House Committee on Ways and
Means version." This revised version of the cumulation provision later
became part of the 1984 Act.4 Thus, Congress appears to have elimi-
38 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv).
39 One could conceivably argue that the requirement that the products be "like" is another crite-
rion for the Commission to use in deciding whether to cumulate. However, the Commission is given
the like product predefined by Commerce and is bound to that in the cumulation decision. See
American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 603, 605-06 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985). American Grape Growers may be reversed on other grounds in the near future as a
result of the decision of the Federal Circuit in American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994
(Fed. Cir. 1986)(the court held that the "reasonable indication" of injury standard used by the
USITC for preliminary determinations in connection with antidumping duties "does not contravene
but accords with clearly discernable legislative intent and is sufficiently reasonable." Id. at 1004.
This decision is contrary to the determination in American Grape Growers that the "reasonable indi-
cation" standard was too strict.)
40 See infra text accompanying notes 53-221.
41 E.g., USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-018 (Jan. 1983) (LEXIS, Itrade library,
Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-I-018].
42 Id.
43 H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(a)(2), 130 CONG. REC. 7948-49 (1984)(Trade Remedies
Reform Act of 1984). Section 105(a)(2) was later incorporated into H.R. 3398, 2d Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. 4516-18 (1983)(which eventually became the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984).
44 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TRADE REMEDIES REFORM AcT OF 1984, H.R. REP.
No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEvs 5127 [here-
inafter REFORM AcT REPORT].
45 The Senate version of the House bill reinstated as a criterion that the marketing of the imports
Northwestern Journal of
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nated reasonably coincident marketing as a distinct criterion for cumula-
tion. It was not eliminated as being irrelevant, but as being unnecessary.
Reasonably coincident marketing is an aspect of competition and as such
should be subsumed in the first element set forth above.
4 6
The majority of the Commission has accepted the staff's three-ele-
ment cumulation test.47 Only Commissioner Liebeler has used the two-
part test set forth above,48 although without providing any significant
critique of the majority and staff position.49
The majority's three-part cumulation test is accompanied by a five-
part subtest as to whether the first element-competition-is satisfied.
The five elements are:
1) the degree of fungibility between imports from different countries
and between imports and the domestic like product, including considera-
tion of specific customer requirements and other quality-related questions;
2) the presence of sales or offers to sell in the same geographic mar-
kets of imports from different countries and the domestic like product;
3) the existence of common or similar channels of distribution for
imports from different countries and the domestic like product;
4) whether the prices of imports and the domestic like product are
within a reasonable range; and
5) whether the imports are simultaneously present in the market. 50
The Commission could properly interpret the final element as in-
cluding reasonably coincident marketing, making that element of the ma-
be reasonably coincident. However, the amended House version was adopted in Conference. See
CONFERENCE COMM., TRADE REMEDIES REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 173, reprinted in part in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4910, 5220 [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 1156].
46 "The Committee does intend, however, that the marketing of the imports that are cumulated
be reasonably coincident." REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 44, at 37. This statement, which is
carried unchanged through later portions of the legislative history, is best seen as an effort to rebut
any assumptions arising from this change to the effect that reasonably coincident marketing is not at
all relevant to a cumulation analysis.
47 Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub.
1753, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-278 to -281 (Prelim.)(Sept. 1985); Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argen-
tina, Canada and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1747, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-255, -256 (Prelim.), 731-TA-275 to -
277 (Prelim.)(Sept. 1985); Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, Taiwan, Tur-
key and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 1742, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-251 to -253 (Prelim.), 731-TA-271 to -274
(Prelim.)(Aug. 1985).
48 See, e.g., Photo Albums and Photo Album Filler Pages from Hong Kong and the Republic of
Korea, USITC Pub. 1660, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-240 to -241 (Prelim.) 7 n. 19 (Mar. 1985).
49 In her frequent and extensive opinions, Vice-Chairwoman Liebeler has sought to define legal
standards in a number of areas but has not focused on this detail in particular.
50 Certain Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from the People's Republic of China, the Philippines
and Singapore, USITC Pub. 1796, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-292 to -296 (Prelim.) 10 n.9 (Dec. 1985): Cer-
tain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. supra note 47; Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Canada and Taiwan, supra note 47: Certain Welded Car-
bon Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, Taiwan, Turkey and Yugoslavia, supra note 47.
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jority's three-part cumulation test redundant. This is, however, only a
minor quibble. To conform the test to the statutory language, a two-part
test should be used and the final element of the competition standard
should include a time aspect. This would render the analysis more pre-
cise. Without such a time element, an inappropriate result might be
reached in an investigation in which the imports to be cumulated were on
the outer reaches of contemporaneity. In such a case, the three-part test
might result in a refusal to cumulate, whereas the two-part test might
result in cumulation, provided the other competition elements were suffi-
ciently persuasive.
In comparing the old standards with the new standards, certain
facts become evident. Elements three through seven of the market analy-
sis approach to cumulation have continued under the guise of the five
competition elements of the new standard. The only noteworthy change
is the more precise wording and geographical bent of the old fourth ele-
ment-competition for end users-as it has metamorphosed into the sec-
ond competition element. Interestingly, old element seven-
simultaneous impact-has now appeared in both the competition test, as
simultaneous presence, and in the staff's three-part cumulation test, as
reasonably coincident marketing. Three of the market analysis elements
have also changed. The first two-volume and volume trend-have been
dropped in response to certain statements in the legislative history.51
The final element-coordinated action by the importers-has likewise
been dropped, although one commissioner refused to yield it until the
1984 Act finally became effective.
52
Apart from the confusion surrounding the proper role of the timing
element of competition in a new cumulation analysis, the overall analytic
elements used by the staff and the Commission majority are appropriate.
What remains to be investigated is how certain of these elements should
be interpreted.
51 This change is particularly relevant to a consideration of whether there is any remaining
ground for a de minimis exception to the cumulation mandate. See infra text accompanying notes
222-41.
52 "Until such time as the provisions of the [1984 Act] relating to cumulation become effective, I
shall continue to require a showing of coordinated activity by the importers as a necessary but not
sufficient condition of cumulation." Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Argentina and Spain, USITC Pub.
1598, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-157, -160 (Final) 18 n.7 (Nov. 1984)(views of Vice-Chairwoman Liebeler).
This coordinated activity standard may have been what the legislative history of the 1984 Act re-
ferred to in commenting vaguely on the use by some commissioners of standards deemed "inappro-
priate." See, e.g., REFORM AcT REPORT, supra note 44, at 37, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
Ncws at 5164 ("Commissioners have imposed conditions which do not seem justified.") Presuma-
bly, the "coordinated action" standard was based on the idea that cross-responsibility could only be
founded upon something akin to, if not actually, a conspiracy.
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IV. "SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION"
When are imports "subject to investigation?" The clearest case is
presented when imports from several countries enter the United States at
the same time, when they all benefit from the same kind of unfair prac-
tice, and when the domestic industry files petitions simultaneously. In
such a case, there can be little doubt that Congress intended the Commis-
sion to cumulate import statistics when considering whether the domes-
tic industry has been injured.53 The more difficult cases arise when the-
petitions are filed at different times, some of the petitions have already
received final injury determinations, different unfair practices are alleged,
or some of the cases do not receive injury determinations under the
United States trade laws.
The legislative history of the 1984 Act clarifies little in these areas of
inquiry. The hearings did not address these issues at all. Relevant dis-
cussion focused merely on the simplest cases, without considering the
more complex situations. 4 The bills which became the Act,55 together
with the congressional reports, 56 merely repeat the phrase "subject to
investigation"5 " without explaining it. The question therefore remains:
When is it appropriate to cumulate in these more complex situations?
In answering this question, one must be careful to distinguish "sub-
ject to investigation" from the timing of marketing the imports. In es-
53 See REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 44, at 36-37, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5163-64. ("The case for cumulation is strongest among cases brought together in a single series of
investigations.") Oil Country Tubular Goods from Austria, Romania, and Venezuela, USITC Pub.
1679, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-240, -241 (Prelim.), 731-TA-249 to 251 (Prelim.) 21 (Apr. 1985)(additional
views of Vice-Chairwoman Liebeler).
54 A report by the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 4784, later absorbed into the bill
that became the 1984 Act, referred to mandating "cumulation of imports of like products from two
or more countries under simultaneous investigation." REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 44, at 8,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5134 (emphasis added). A representative of domestic
interests similarly stated: "We do specifically request that Congress require the International Trade
Commission to cumulate where the product is fungible and where cases are brought simultaneously."
Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways & Means, Part 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 617 (1983)(statement of Terence P. Stewart,
Esq.) (emphasis added)[hereinafter Options to Improve. Part 2].
55 H.R. 6064, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 9656-63 (1984)(Miscellaneous Tariff and
Customs Amendments); H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 7938-44 (1984)(Trade
Remedies Reform Act of 1984); H.R. 3398 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 221S-25
(1984)(Trade and Tariff Act of 1984).
56 See generally 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4910.
57 "Of course, imports of like products from countries not subject to investigation would not be
included in such cumulation." H.R. REP. No 1156, supra note 45, at 173, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 5290; REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 44, at 37, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5164; see SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 98TH
CONG., 2D Sass., REPORT ON H.R. 4784: TRADE REMEDIES REFORM ACT OF 1984 27 (Comm.
Print 1984).
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sence, "reasonably coincident" marketing creates the possibility of
multiple causation of injury to the domestic industry. 8 In contrast, the
"subject to investigation" standard relates to administrative efficiency,
international obligations, and fairness of substantive result.5 9 Naturally,
there is some correlation between the two concepts in that coincident
imports are more likely to lead to simultaneous or overlapping investiga-
tions. Nonetheless, it does not follow that the two concepts are
coterminous.
A. Purposes of the "Subject to Investigation" Standard
The following are the purposes most likely intended by the "subject
to investigation" standard: 1) promoting administrative economy;
2) maintaining parallelism of result for essentially similar cases; 3) pro-
moting fairness by limiting the effect of an injury finding to those coun-
tries or importers actually participating in the Commission proceeding;
4) satisfying GATT standards of causation; 5) encouraging domestic dili-
gence in bringing petitions; and 6) not burdening domestic parties with
the responsibility for investigation timing beyond their control. A dis-
cussion of these six purposes of the standard is given below.
1) Divided investigations harm administrative efficiency and econ-
omy because new investigations of the same industry will require essen-
tially duplicative steps to be taken. Duplicative staff time is also
involved. Although some work duplication may be avoided,6" much of
the numerical analysis and summarization must be redone. In addition,
largely duplicative requests for information must be made, at least to
members of the domestic industry, if not to members of the channels of
common distribution and to end users.6' Since the Commission some-
times has difficulty obtaining relevant information, 62 divided investiga-
tions of industries may render accurate information gathering more
58 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 60-80.
60 Questionnaires, for example, may be reused with a minimum of revision. Congress has to be
concerned with designing legislation to avoid "unnecessary and costly investigations which are an
administrative burden" on the Commission. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7308.
61 Completed questionnaires are part of the Commission record in a Title VII investigation. 19
C.F.R. § 207.2(i)(1) (1986). Such questionnaires may have subpoena force. 19 C.F.R. § 207.8
(1986).
62 See Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan and Venezuela, USITC Pub.
1639, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-211 to -212, at 13 (Feb. 1985). Timely questionnaire responses were re-
ceived from manufacturers representing less than 10% of domestic shipments of line pipes and tubes.
The Commission voted in the negative as to line pipes and tubes largely on the basis of this "extraor-
dinarily low" response. Id.
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difficult. Such investigations may also affect substantive results in an un-
desirable way.
6 3
2) If statistics in one investigation, for example, imports from the
country Alpha, can influence the outcome of another investigation, for
example, imports from country Beta, then equitably, the Beta statistics
should influence the outcome of the Alpha investigation. Balancing
against this is the argument that allowing the Alpha investigation to be
decided on partial information is no reason to allow the Beta investiga-
tion to be decided on partial information, now that full information is
available. The only real risk is that imports from Alpha will not have a
duty imposed on them that would have been imposed had the Beta im-
port statistics been considered. Weighing the merits of the latter argu-
ment requires balancing the achievement of some substantively proper
results against the arbitrariness of reaching different results in essentially
identical investigations brought at different times.64
3) If injury could be found by cumulating all imports, whether or
not under investigation, into an investigation of imports from the country
Gamma, then primary injury causation could be from fairly-traded im-
ports, with the unfairly traded imports being only an ancillary cause. In
effect, statutory remedies would be used to counter competition as a
whole, rather than against only those elements of competition which are
unfair. The United States import relief statute,65 which is designed to
protect domestic industries against injurious fair trade, requires that the
imports be a "substantial cause" of injury.66 This is defined as requiring
the imports to be at least as important a cause of injury as any other
cause. 67 Any attempt to use fair imports as part of a cumulative injury
analysis directed against allegedly unfair imports would therefore result
in holding the fair imports to too low a standard of injury causation.
Furthermore, it is inequitable to hold one source responsible for produc-
ing all the fairly-caused injury from another source.
4) To the extent that cumulation allocates injury causation from
one source to another, GATT may be violated. 61 Under GATT, no com-
pensatory duty may be imposed on a signatory's unfair imports unless
63 Id. at 17-21 (dissenting views of Commissioner Eckes concerning line pipes and tubes).
64 In congressional hearings prior to passage of the 1984 Act, one witness suggested that Con-
gress should consider allowing respondents in trade actions to join third parties as corespondents. to
limit the risk of this kind of arbitrariness. Options to Improve, Part 2, supra note 54, at 906-07
(statement of Robert M. Gottschalk, Esq.).
65 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
66 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1).
67 Id.
68 See Agreement on Articles VI, XVI and XXIII. supra note 10, at 524. For an expression of
Congress' desire to avoid "impediment[s] to trade" arising from the unfair trade statutes. see H.R.
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injury causation is shown.69 GATT requires a direct causal link for each
country.7° Cumulation may be used to impute injury to each country by
reason of a direct causal link to a group of countries. If so used, cumula-
tion may violate GATT.
71
5) Domestic industry diligence in bringing petitions is desirable.
The domestic industry is usually in the best position to know which im-
ports are causing it harm. Further, the domestic industry is usually the
only party bringing petitions.72  It is difficult, however, to establish a uni-
form standard of diligence that is fair to impose upon all domestic indus-
tries. Unless there are special considerations behind a failure of a
domestic industry to bring all petitions relevant to the same product at or
near the same time,73 perhaps the domestic industry should be held re-
sponsible for not doing so.
6) Although domestic parties bring petitions at times of their
choosing, they do not control the timing of the ensuing investigations.
REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7186, 7308.
69 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement, supra note 10, at 523-
25. If cumulation is used to tie together injury and unrelated imports (scapegoats) then GATT is
violated. But this statement, though true, begs the issue since cumulation is only defensible to the
extent that it is a method of determining injury causation. This may suggest, however, that a de
minimis standard is appropriate for GATT signatories in the cumulation analysis. See infra text
accompanying note 22341.
70 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
71 Cumulation may also be used to allocate injury causation from non-GATT sources to GATT
sources. This would also be a violation of the letter and the spirit of GATT. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 202-12.
72 A domestic industry is not the only party that may commence an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty action, as the Department of Commerce may "self-initiate" an investigation. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a). However, this self-initiating power has rarely been invoked. An exception
existed under the Steel Trigger Price Mechanism operating in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
Trigger Price Mechanism worked to establish floor price levels below which imported steel products
could not fall without the Department of Commerce initating sua sponte an antidumping investiga-
tion. Proposed Amendments to the Customs Regulations Relating to the Documents and Informa-
tion Required to be filed at the Time of Importation of Certain Articles of Steel, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,215
(Dept. Treas. 1977). E.g., Certain Steel Wire Nails from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Yugo-
slavia, USITC Pub. 1175, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-45 to -47 (Prelim.) (Aug. 1981). For a good analysis of
the background and workings of the Trigger Price Mechanism, see Note, Effective Enforcement of
U.S. Antidumping Laws: the Development and Legal Implications of Trigger Pricing, 10 LAW &
POL'Y INT'I. Bus. 969 (1978). More recently, the Commerce Department announced that it was
self-initating an antidumping investigation against 256K dynamic random access memory chips
from Japan. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above from
Japan, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,450 (Dept. Treas. 1985) (initiation of antidumping investigation). This re-
mains, however, an isolated incident at the time o'r writing of this article.
73 For example, information resources in the domestic market may be inadequate to identify
with ease all import sources, or the domestic industry might be so fragmented that individual peti-
tioners may not care about injury to other segments of the industry.
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Designation of some actions as "extraordinarily complicated," ' 74 the ex-
tension of an antidumping investigation,75 or the suspension and later
recontinuation of an investigation,76 may delay some investigations.77 In
at least one case, a country chose to become a GATT member while an
action under the non-GATT coutervailing duty law
78 was underway. 79
This required termination of that investigation and commencement of a
new one under a different statutory provision." This timing factor miti-
gates the influence of the domestic diligence factor.
Precisely how these combined factors guide the interpretation of
"subject to investigation" remains to be seen. The significance of these
factors will vary from context to context. This Article now turns to de-
fining the scope of "subject to investigation" in contexts that vary in
terms of the timing of the investigations, the phase of the investigations,
and the types of unfair trade practices alleged by domestic industries.
B. Cumulation between Overlapping Investigations
When petitions are filed under the same statutory provision at differ-
ent times, the Commission investigations may overlap some or not at all.
To better understand overlapping investigations, assume domestic widget
manufacturers file on March 1 an antidumping petition"' against imports
from Alpha. If the domestic widget industry then brings a petition
against allegedly dumped widgets from Beta, the industry could do so at
any time after March 1. If the petition regarding Beta widgets is filed
after March 182 and before the preliminary injury determination concern-
ing Alpha imports is reached, the preliminary injury investigations will
overlap to some degree and will be able to inform and influence each
other. This is a clear case of "subject to investigation" coverage and no
74 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(countervailing duty investigations); 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(c)(antidumping
investigations).
75 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(2).
76 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(g)(countervailing duty investigations); 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(g)(antidumping
investigations).
77 Options to Improve, Part 2, supra note 54, at 771.
78 Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
79 Prestressed Steel Wire Strand from Spain, USITC Pub. 1281, Inv. No. 701-TA-164 (Final) at
A-1 (Aug. 1982)(notice of Spain joining GATT was transmitted to the Commission on Apr. 26,
1982, while a § 303 investigation regarding Spanish imports was underway).
80 Id. For a domestic perspective on the effect of the Spanish accession to GATT upon the trade
investigations, see Options to Improve, Part 2, supra note 54, at 617.
81 A countervailing duty petition would lead to the same analysis. Details of the timing, not
relevant here, would differ.
82 There is no suggestion from any source that the Commission should not cumulate, as not
being "under investigation," imports from two countries as to which petitions were filed on the same
day.
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dispute arises as to the applicability of the cumulation analysis. This case
demonstrates adequate domestic diligence, permits administrative effi-
ciency, limits the causation analysis to allegedly unfairly traded imports,
allows cross-fertilization of results, obviates the need to inquire as to why
the domestic parties were unable to control the timing of investigation,
and presents no greater case for arguing that GATT has been violated
than is presented by any other circumstance of timing and cumulation.
This situation has arisen repeatedly in recent Commission investiga-
tions both before and after the effective date of the 1984 Act.83 Where
there has already been an affirmative preliminary determination with re-
spect to Alpha imports, the Commission has normally cumulated Alpha
statistics with Beta statistics for purposes of the Beta preliminary deter-
mination.84 This approach seems sound. Although domestic diligence
may not be as evident, the domestic industry must have acted with rea-
sonable diligence to have brought petitions within a few months of each
other. Administrative resources may be saved to some extent by as-
signing personnel familiar with the Alpha analysis to the Beta investiga-
tion. The importers were probably aware of each others' investigations
and may have pooled defense information and resources to demonstrate
health in the domestic industry.
If the domestic widget industry brings the petition regarding Beta
widgets between the preliminary and the final injury investigations con-
cerning Alpha imports, then the two investigations will overlap. How-
ever, the Alpha final determination may precede the preliminary Beta
determination. Furthermore, the injury tests for final determinations are
more difficult to satisfy than are the tests for preliminary determina-
tions.86 These disparities in timing and tests may cause difficulties if the
Commission attempts to cumulate statistics from Alpha and Beta in
either investigation.
83 Certain Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from the People's Republic of China, the Philippines,
and Singapore, supra note 50; USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-F-196 (June 1982)
(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file).
84 See, eg., Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Canada, and Taiwan, supra note 47;
Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From India, Taiwan, Turkey and Yugoslavia, supra
note 47; Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand and Venezuela, supra note 53;
Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan and Venezuela, supra note 62; Certain
Steel Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1255, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-155 to -163 (Prelim.) (June 1982).
See also Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, Portugal, and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1701, Inv. Nos.
701-TA-243, -244 (Prelim.), 731-TA-256 to -258 (Prelim.) (May 1985) (Chairwoman Stein and Vice-
Chairwoman Liebeler acted with respect to the German Democratic Republic).
85 For example, importers may combine efforts to show a pattern of sales lost by them to the
domestic industry. Antitrust and other business considerations may prevent some types of informa-
tion sharing.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
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Even if the Alpha statistics are relevant to the Beta preliminary in-
vestigation, two questions remain: 1) Should the statistics being devel-
oped in the Beta investigation be used to help find injury in the final
determination for Alpha, even if a preliminary affirmative determination
for Beta has not yet been made?; and 2) Should the Alpha statistics and
results, if affirmative, be used not only for the Beta preliminary analysis
but also for the Beta final analysis?
With respect to the first question, such cross-fertilization would do
much to prevent an inequality in the results. The risk, however, is that
there may be a preliminary negative determination with respect to Beta
or that a preliminary affirmative Beta determination may be followed by
a negative final Beta determination. This could happen even without the
cumulation of Alpha statistics in the Beta investigations if, for example,
new facts or statistics indicated that no domestic injury existed87 or if the
Commerce Department issued a "no dumping" or "no subsidy" deter-
mination. Beta imports would then not be subject to any antidumping or
countervailing duties, yet would have been considered a part of the
causal link attributed to Alpha. This is obviously an unfair result. There
appears to be no easy answer to this analysis unless, perhaps, a de
minimis analysis is used to decrease the incidence of such inequities.88
As the Beta negative determination by either the Commission or the
Commerce Department could arise from a variety of circumstances be-
yond low market share and changes for the better in domestic statistics,
even a de minimis approach would not eliminate all unfair results.
The Commission legal staff has suggested an alternative remedy to
this problem. They propose that, if Beta is later found to be noninjuri-
ous, Alpha could file for a § 751(b) review.89 This would be a viable
approach to rectify the problem. This approach could, however, be made
an even more viable option if the Commission were to present its analysis
of Alpha in the alternative: "if Beta is cumulated, then Alpha is injuri-
87 Remember, cumulation is a causation analysis, not an injury analysis.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 201-20.
89 USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-197 (Sept. 1985) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-177 (Aug. 1985) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-064 (Apr. 1985) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-85-010 (Jan. 1985) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-351 (Dec. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-334 (Dec. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-329 (Nov. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-322 (Nov. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-263 (Sept. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-142 (May 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-133 (May 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file)[hereinafter GC-H-133].
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ous; if Beta is not cumulated, then ...." This would signal the outcome
of a § 751(b) review, thereby discouraging unnecessary reviews and al-
lowing expedited treatment of necessary ones.
As to the second question, a conflict arises between common sense
and the most restrictive reading of the words "subject to investigation."
The basic purpose of a preliminary investigation is to weed out nonmeri-
torious petitions on the basis of initial factual findings. 90 The final inves-
tigation, in contrast, is designed to develop a much greater store of
information for the Commission to consider. For information to be con-
sidered relevant to a preliminary investigation and then discarded in a
final investigation stands the process on its head. It moves from more to
less information rather than the other way around. 91 There would be no
point in continuing the Beta investigation through preliminary cumula-
tion analysis, knowing that cumulation would be improper during the
final investigation. 92 Indeed, this might encourage fishing expeditions for
other causal analyses at the expense of Commission staff time. Although
the Alpha imports are no longer "subject to investigation" at the time of
the Beta final determination, a similar objection could be made even if
the petitions were filed one day apart and the final determinations came
down one day apart. This restrictive linguistic analysis goes too far in
seeking to prevent cumulation.
Potential inequality of result is not severe enough to warrant
noncumulation whenever petitions are filed somewhat out of phase. To
refuse to cumulate on this basis would require a domestic industry seek-
ing redress from combined-source injury to control the timing of peti-
tions to within a period of a few months. This may be possible for an
essentially monolithic industry. Where, however, no strong central
power or interest group exists in the industry, the act of one industry
member filing a petition against imports from Alpha should not preclude
other industry members from filing petitions in the coming months.
Where there is no uniformity of structure among the industries filing un-
90 American Lamb Co., 785 F.2d at 1004.
91 Admittedly, it is not the information that is discarded, but the analysis. This has the effect of
disregarding an aspect of causation that may have led to the initial finding of a reasonable indication
of injury.
92 There is one additional twist in the area of overlapping investigations that deserves mention.
In one preliminary determination where the Commission was faced with overlapping investigations
of the type under consideration here, Chairwoman Stem cumulated the Alpha statistics into the Beta
analysis to determine whether there was a reasonable indication of material injury, but refused to
cumulate to determine whether there was a reasonable indication of the threat of material injury.
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Austria, Romania, and Venezuela, supra note 53. This article
expresses no opinion on this intriguing distinction.
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fair trade petitions, flexibility is needed. Any other reading would strain
the meaning of "subject to investigation."
The Commission staff has proposed a possible solution to the prob-
lem of overlapping investigations. They have suggested on several occa-
sions that cumulation of imports may be proper after the date of a final
determination of injury with respect to all imports arriving in the United
States prior to the date cash deposits9 3 to remedy the unfair trade prac-
tice94 are made. This suggestion is based upon the observation that it is
not until the cash deposits are posted that the imports cease to create new
injury to the domestic industry.95 However, the staff acknowledges that
this proposal concerning cash deposits is not based upon a strict reading
of the statutory language.
96
This cash deposit analysis creates unnecessary problems. There may
be some delay and difficulty in determining import volume just before the
date the cash deposits are posted. There may also be serious grounds for
review if the amounts of the cash deposits are later challenged as being
insufficient. In addition, by conceding that the cash deposit analysis is
not strictly based upon the terms of the statute, the staff exposes to court
challenges the Commission determinations based upon this approach.
Finally, this acknowledgment reveals the strained nature of the analysis.
In great part, the staff's choice to use the date of the cash deposits
may arise from its institutional concern over specific deadlines for deter-
minations. By focusing on the date of a determination as the decisive
criterion of the "subject to investigation" standard, the staff is forced into
this intriguing, although flawed, analysis in order to reach even mini-
mally out-of-phase investigations. By focusing on the period of the inves-
tigation, rather than the date of the determination, the approach
suggested by this Article avoids these problems while remaining within a
fair reading of the statutory language.
In summary, it would seem that investigations which overlap to
some degree will, as a general rule, be appropriate for cumulation. Ele-
ments of economy and efficiency, domestic diligence, and the purposes
93 USITC General Counsel 'Memorandum GC-J-024 (Feb. 1986)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-188 (Sept. 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gem
file)[hereinafter GC-I-188]; USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-109 (June 1985)(LEXIS,
Itrade library, Gem file)[hereinafter GC-I-109]; USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-082
(May 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-I-082]; USITC General Counsel Mem-
orandum GC-I-060 (Apr. 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-I-060].
94 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(3)(countervailing duty cash deposits required); 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3)
(antidumping duty cash deposits required).
95 USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-230 (Nov. 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file); GC-I-109, supra note 93; GC-I-082, supra note 93; GC-I-060, supra note 93.
96 GC-I-188, supra note 93; GC-1-082 supra note 93; GC-I-060 supra note 93.
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behind a cumulation analysis suggest that this result is reasonable, even
where the investigations are out of phase to a considerable degree. This
result can be reached within a fair reading of the statutory provision.
This approach should, however, be limited to exclude investigations with
so little overlap that no meaningful cross-fertilization of analysis or result
can occur. In these cases, elements of fairness of substantive outcome are
very different from the usual overlap case, diligence is less obvious, and
efficiency is greatly diminished. For these reasons, the situation of "no
effective overlap" should be considered as being a "no-
overlap" situation. 97
C. Cumulation with Final Determinations
Where investigations do not overlap-where Beta files after Alpha's
final order has been issued-a serious question arises as to whether cu-
mulation of Alpha into Beta's investigation would be appropriate. The
operative language of the new cumulation provision, "subject to investi-
gation," appears to require some present investigatory risk9" to imports
before their statistics must be cumulated. The legislative history of the
1984 Act would appear to support this view. A Senate provision that
would have required cumulation of imports from countries subject to fi-
nal orders, as well as from countries under investigation, was rejected in
Conference Committee in favor of the House language requiring that the
imports to be cumulated all be "subject to investigation."99
L Section 751(a) Reviews as "Investigations"
Arguments have been made before the Commission that imports
subject to a final dumping or countervailing duty order might still be
subject to investigation under the unfair trade laws and thus must be
cumulated in current investigations. In particular, the Commission has
been urged to consider the potential for a § 751(a) annual review of an
97 See infra text accompanying notes 98-121.
98 In one memorandum to the Commission, dated between the passage of the 1984 Act and its
effective date, the legal staff notes petitioners' views that the "subject to investigation" standard
"should be deemed to include imports which were covered by an investigatory stage of an unfair
trade proceeding at a time during the three year period of analysis in the instant investigation." The
staff did not support this view. USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-307 (Oct.
1984)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-H-307].
99 H.R. REP. No. 1156, supra note 45, at 173, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5290.
Curiously, the Commission legal staff, in support of its position favoring cumulation of statistics
from past investigations into ongoing investigations, has referred to this legislative history as illus-
trating how Congress "removed the limitation regarding final orders contained in the Senate version
of the provision." GC-H-060, supra note 93 (emphasis added).
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existing final duty order 00 as satisfying the "subject to investigation" re-
quirement. t1 ' There are several reasons why it should not satisfy the
requirement.
First, potential for review is an overly broad argument.'0 2 If such
potential could satisfy the "subject to investigation" requirement, then a
fortiori potential for § 701 or § 731 action could also satisfy "subject to
investigation." Yet imports from every country are subject to potential
investigation under these provisions. Hence, every country, whether or
not subject to a current investigation, could be cumulated into an ongo-
ing investigation.
Second, if actual, not potential, § 751(a) status were the determi-
nant, the outcome might be dictated by arbitrary timing. Such reviews
are conducted on an annual basis. 0 3 On the one hand, whether a coun-
try subject to a final order was cumulated into a new investigation would
depend upon the happenstance of when the filing of the current petition
occurred. In contrast, it is unlikely that the domestic industry would
ignore the timing of an upcoming § 75 1(a) review when selecting its filing
date. This would create a situation akin to grabbing the gold ring in an
old-fashioned merry-go-round: attorneys for domestic industries would
concentrate their energies upon selecting a filing date based upon the
scheduling of a § 751(a) review, lest they be required to wait until the
next review period. Congress could hardly have meant to impose this
arbitrary link of timing and substantive outcome on the statutory scheme
and the domestic industry. Further, if several nonoverlapping § 751(a)
reviews were scheduled to occur with respect to a number of outstanding
final orders relating to the same industry, then domestic parties would
have to choose their timing and, in so doing, select some, but not all,
countries for cumulation. This choice would not have been written si-
lently into the statute.
Third, finding a § 751(a) review to satisfy the statutory language is
improper in that § 751(a) involves a "review," which is more limited
than an "investigation." '04 Technically, the words do not fit. Therefore,
100 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a).
10' Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1642, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-225 to -234
(Prelim.), 731-TA-213 to -217, -219, -221 to -226, -228 to -235 (Prelim.) 48 (Feb. 1985)(views of
Vice-Chairwoman Liebeler). This was the first injury investigation to be conducted under the terms
of the 1984 Act.
102 Id. at 49.
103 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a).
104 Section 751, 19 U.S.C. § 1675, is entitled "Administrative Review of Determinations" and
use of the term "review" is consistent throughout the section. But see Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.
v. United States, 745 F.2d 632 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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applying the plain terms of the statute, and interpreting the trade remedy
statutes in pari delicto, imports subject to a § 751(a) review are not "sub-
ject to investigation" and should not be cumulated with ongoing
investigations.
Fourth, the purposes of § 751(a) belie the argument that such a re-
view satisfies the "subject to investigation" requirement, thus allowing
cumulation to occur. Section 751(a) was designed to estimate the current
amounts of duties owed and to provide a sunset for outstanding an-
tidumping and countervailing duty orders once the importer can estab-
lish that the goods are no longer being traded unfairly.' °5 Thus, § 751(a)
was enacted, in part, for the benefit of importers and foreign parties who
are conforming their behavior to fair standards. It was also enacted, in
part, to conform with GATT requirements10 6 that imports be both unfair
and injurious before antidumping or countervailing duties may be im-
posed. Imports which are no longer both unfair and injurious should no
longer be subject to outstanding duty orders. By removing fairly-traded
or noninjurious imports from the list of outstanding orders, the Customs
Service is left free to concentrate its enforcement energies on presently
injurious unfair imports.1
0 7
Thus, § 75 1(a) operates to benefit compliant foreign interests, multi-
lateral trade policy, and administrative efficiency. It was not enacted as a
further weapon against imports from other countries or as a tool to allow
domestic parties a greater chance of establishing injury before the Com-
mission. It may be that countries subject to outstanding final orders
should be cumulated with current investigations, but § 751(a) is not ap-
propriate support for this argument.
It might be argued that outstanding final orders include imports that
are subject to investigation in that these imports are subject to the results
of an investigation previously undertaken by the Commission.0o Clearly
this strains the statutory language. Unless imports from Alpha are under
investigation at the same time as the Beta investigation is under way,
Alpha imports are not "subject to investigation" and should not be
cumulated under § 771(7).
105 REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 44, at 19-23, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEvs at
5146-49.
106 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
107 See REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 44, at 22-23 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5149.
108 See Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan and Venezuela, supra note 62.
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2. Fitting Final Orders into the Statutory Framework
Underlying the efforts to bring outstanding final orders into the lan-
guage of "subject to investigation" is a belief that such final orders should
be cumulated for policy and analytic reasons despite the strictures of the
statutory language. Although it can easily be argued that this is a deci-
sion for Congress to make, this belief has some merit. Perhaps these
concerns could be addressed by another method, consistent with the stat-
ute and legislative intent, for taking into account the earlier investigation.
The basic reason proponents put forth to include final orders in a
cumulation analysis is that inclusion is necessary to remedy the "ham-
mering effect" of injury from multiple-source imports.'0 9 It was this
hammering effect that concerned Congress when it considered cumula-
tion. 11" That the unfair and injurious imports have been subjected to an
outstanding final order does not mean the domestic industry has recov-
ered from the injury. The order signifies that the domestic industry
should suffer no new injury from that source. If Beta imports subse-
quently enter domestic commerce at an unfair price, they find an already
weakened industry more prone to injury. This greater likelihood of in-
jury, proponents say, is why the imports should be cumulated.
Several counterarguments exist to the hammering effect argument.
The one raised most frequently is that, once a final order has been en-
tered, the imports subject to that final order are, by definition, no longer
causally relevant' to a new injury analysis." 2 This counterargument,
while superficially attractive, overlooks economic reality and congres-
sional concerns. A domestic industry does not recover from a period in
which it has been suffering material injury merely because a final order
has been entered into against the unfair imports. Nor does the domestic
industry recover simultaneously with such an order. Congress instructed
the Commission to determine material injury after analyzing domestic
industry trends in profitability, market share, capacity utilization, return
on investments, employment, and product pricing, among other fac-
tors. 113 The statistics in this area do not reach appropriate noninjury-
demonstrating levels immediately upon removal of the offending import
advantage." 4 Several of these factors indicate injury precisely because
109 See supra note 3.
110 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
I I Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, supra note 101.
112 Id.
113 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii).
114 "In the case of the steel industry, a large measure of our current capital shortfall is attributa-
ble to the cumulative effect of years of lost sales and price suppression at the hands of unfairly traded
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they are long-term in effect. Lost market share may be difficult to recap-
ture. Skilled employees may be difficult to rehire or replace. Steady de-
clines in capacity utilization may have led to actual diminishment of
capacity and take years to replace.
Thus, although final order imports are now fairly traded, the con-
cern over the injury caused while they were unfairly traded has not
ended. While this old source may have caused no new injury, there may
be a causal link between this old source and injuries inflicted by another
source. How much of a causal link there will exist will vary from case to
case. Three factors relevant to such an inquiry are: 1) the length of time
between the final order for Alpha and the injury investigation for Beta;
2) the nature of the injury to the domestic industry from the Alpha im-
ports; and 3) the nature of the industry subject to investigation. A dis-
cussion of each factor is given below.
1) The longer the time, the less likely it is that imports from Beta
will have been able to inflict an injury related to the injury caused by
Alpha. Thus, the longer the time span, the more appropriate it is to
allow the Beta investigation to proceed without reference to the Alpha
statistics.
2) If Alpha's imports inflected a flesh wound-e.g., market share,
price, and unskilled labor hours fell by small percentages; the domestic
industry was still profitable but at lower than anticipated levels; and
there were no other indications of significant domestic injury-then im-
ports from Beta are unlikely to inflict an injury related to that produced
by the Alpha imports. If, however, Alpha's imports dealt the domestic
industry a more severe blow--e.g., industry losses increased over several
years, factories shut down, layoffs of skilled labor occurred, industries
lost technological edge, and commitments for long-term contracts went
to others-then the Beta imports are likely to inflict a related injury. In
either situation, it is not the Alpha import statistics that are relevant, but
the nature of the injury caused by the Alpha imports.
3) Although this factor is closely related to the second factor, it is
worth considering separately. Some industries are able to recover from
serious injury more quickly than others. Factors including capital invest-
ment requirements, long-range contract patterns within the industry, and
development times for input materials, processes, and product develop-
ment are all relevant to the industry's ability to recover quickly from
injury.
Each of these factors must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. De-
imports." Options to Improve, Part 1, supra note 2, at 164 (statement of Robert B. Peabody, Presi-
dent of the American Steel Institute).
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pending upon the factor under examination, the relevance of the Alpha-
induced injury to the Beta injury will vary.
The greatest difficulty in analyzing Beta by cumulating Alpha with
Beta statistics arises from the fact that cumulation is an all-or-nothing
tool. Commissioners must cumulate statistics totally or not at all,
prompting arbitrary decisions as to cumulation in marginal cases.115
What is needed is a flexible approach reflecting the impact of the shifting
time frames, injuries, and industries involved.
Pre-1984 Act determinations may provide a solution. During this
period, a prior pattern of injurious, unfair imports was sometimes treated
as relevant to a new injury analysis. This was achieved by considering
the prior injury to the domestic industry as one of the aspects of competi-
tion by which the injury to the domestic industry had to be measured."
16
In investigations utilizing this "competitive factors approach," '117 the
Commission considered the imports not under investigation as factors
indicating increased competitive pressure on the domestic industry." 8
This approach, which does not involve cumulation, would be sufficiently
flexible to allow the domestic industry some measure of protection from
repeated unfair competition, yet would focus the inquiry on the condition
of the industry and its whole or partial recovery from the previous injury.
In the competitive factors approach, imports not being cumulated,
but considered relevant to an injury analysis, are considered to have
placed the domestic industry in a more vulnerable state than the industry
would have been in otherwise. Extending this analysis to its logical con-
clusion, the existence of a large number of noncumulated imports that
115 For example, in Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan and Venezuela,
supra note 62, at 12, Chairwoman Stern cumulated allegedly less than fair value ("LTFV") imports
from Brazil and LTFV imports from Taiwan in her analysis of allegedly LTFV Venezuelan imports,
while Commissioner Rohr cumulated LTFV imports from Korea as well. See also Certain Welded
Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand and Venezuela, supra note 84; Certain Carbon Steel
Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Swe-
den, and Venezuela, supra note 101.
116 The investigations in which the Commission used this approach did not involve all of the
situations in which this Article proposes the approach as an appropriate solution. See infra text
accompanying notes 130-214. Nevertheless, the basic concept the Commission used in those investi-
gations is sound and deserves wider application in light of increased pressure upon the Commission
to extend its injury analyses beyond consideration of single import factors in isolation. "Although
we did not cumulate imports from [the country under investigation] with imports from other coun-
tries, we did consider these [latter] imports ... as factors in the market which may have contributed
to the overall condition of the domestic industry." Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from the
United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1343, Inv. No. 731-TA-89 (Final) 7 n.23 (Feb. 1983).
117 "Competitive factors approach" is a name adopted for convenience in this article. This ap-
proach never received a name from the Commission.
118 See, e.g., Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from the United Kingdom, supra note 116:
Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from Spain. supra note 79.
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are considered as competitive factors in the marketplace would strongly
support an argument that the unfair imports under investigation found a
weakened industry readily susceptible to injury.' 1 9 Thus, for example,
import volume and market share statistics that might otherwise indicate
no injury to the domestic industry would now support an affirmative in-
jury determination. Injury would be readily found. Injury would not,
however, be found automatically if, for example, the imports under in-
vestigation were cumulated with imports subject to a recent affirmative
injury determination.
In conclusion, there is no statutory basis for cumulation of statistics
with respect to imports already subject to a final order when a new peti-
tion is filed. Yet imports already subject to a final order have caused
injury. This injury, though no longer being freshly caused, may have
persisted up until the present. If this is true, the prior determination is
relevant to the new petition. 120 The nature of continuing injury, as op-
posed to continuing causation, suggests that the old harm should be
viewed as a condition of the domestic industry as it faces new unfair
imports, not as a factor establishing causation for injury from the new
imports. Prior injury should be considered, along with its degree of at-
tenuation or recovery, and new injury or a limitation of recovery would
constitute the material injury sought in the statute. Threat of material
injury could thus encompass the threat of material limitation of
recovery. 121
D. Cross-Cumulation
One area of cumulation law which has been the subject of considera-
ble debate following the passage of the 1984 Act is that of cross-cumula-
tion. Cross-cumulation is the cumulation of statistics relating to dumped
imports into a countervailing duty injury investigation or of statistics re-
lating to subsidized imports into an antidumping injury investigation. In
the simplest form of this issue, if the Commission is conducting simulta-
neous injury investigations with respect to dumped widgets from Alpha
and subsidized widgets from Beta, should or must it cumulate the import
statistics in assessing injury to the domestic widget industry? Although
the Commission has frequently been called upon to cross-cumulate, it
119 This is somewhat akin to the tort concept of having a tortfeasor be responsible for the injury
he or she has done to a victim, even if the victim was unusually prone to such an injury.
120 This continuing injury should not be used against the petitioner as an alternate causal expla-
nation for injury from a source other than the imports under investigation.
121 This is analogous to how price suppression can be as telling as price depression in a Commis-
sion injury analysis. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(C)(ii)(II).
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has never done so. Whether the 1984 Act requires cross-cumulation is
the subject of this section.
1. History of Cumulation in Countervailing Duty Investigations
The Commission has only recently come to accept the position that
it may cumulate in dealing with subsidy investigations. This issue first
arose in 1982.122 The issue arose late because of the nature of the unfair
act involved, namely subsidization.
In countervailing duty investigations, as opposed to dumping inves-
tigations, the exporting country is directly involved. The domestic indus-
try complains of a subsidy provided by a country or political entity
within a country. 123 In contrast, the identity of the exporting country is
irrelevant in antidumping investigations, whereas in countervailing duty
investigations it is central. Hence, this argument may be stated: cumulat-
ing different countries, with different subsidies, makes no sense.
One exception always noted to this analysis is the customs union.
124
Where a customs union acts as one entity to provide a subsidy, combin-
ing the import statistics with respect to different countries involved is
proper. This does not represent cumulation in the strict sense. Rather,
the customs union is treated as a single "country under the Agreement,"
the Agreement being the GATT Subsidies Code. Since the customs
union is defined as one country, 125 cumulation is not needed to combine
the import statistics. Furthermore, because the Commerce Department,
and not the Commission, makes this determination, it is procedurally
different from cumulation, although the effect of aggregating statistics is
the same.
126
Countering the argument that the country is important in counter-
vailing duty investigations is the argument that the Commerce Depart-
ment deals with the country of origin of the unfairly traded goods,
whereas the Commission makes only the injury determination. Injury
122 Hot-RolIed Carbon Steel Plate from Belgium and Brazil, supra note 32; Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Sheet from France, USITC Pub. 1206, Inv. No. 701-TA-85 (Prelim.)(Jan. 1982); Hot-Rolled
Carbon Steel Plate from Romania, supra note 32; GC-E-337, supra note 31, at n.3. Interestingly, as
early as June 1982, the Staff agreed with a petitioner that both the European Community Commis-
sion and the Canadian Antidumping Tribunal appear to cumulate imports under investigation regu-
larly, even in countervailing duty investigations. GC-F-186, supra note 31.
123 See supra note 8.
124 An example of such an entity is the European Community. See USITC General Counsel
Memorandum GC-F-034 (Feb. 1982)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-F-034]: So-
dium Gluconate from the European Communities, USITC Pub. 1169, Inv. No. 701-TA-79 (Prelim.)
(July 1981).
125 19 U.S.C. § 1677(3).
126 Sodium Gluconate from the European Communities, supra note 124, at 8-9.
460
Cumulation of Import Statistics
7:433(1986)
determinations focus on the impact the imports have on the domestic
industry, not the injury's source. Hence, this argument stresses the simi-
larities between antidumping and countervailing duty investigations
rather than their disparities. Recognizing these similarities, the Commis-
sion staff recommended the use of cumulation in countervailing duty in-
vestigations 12 7 and the Commission accepted the recommendation.
128
With the passage of the 1984 Act, countervailing duty cumulation is
no longer an issue. The cumulation requirement of § 612(a)(2)(A)(iv)
specifically relates to countervailing duty investigations.129 Thus, cumu-
lation is now proper in countervailing duty injury investigations as it has
long been recognized to be in antidumping injury investigations.
2. Cross-Cumulation under the 1984 Act
The issue remaining is: What should the Commission do when faced
with simultaneous countervailing duty and antidumping investigations?
Only one commissioner, no longer with the Commission, had ever voted
to cross-cumulate. 130 He did so without much, if any, analysis of the
ramifications of such a vote. Most of the current commissioners who
have addressed the issue have rejected the idea. 3' Yet the issue contin-
ues to survive. Indeed, the Commission's own legal staff has repeatedly
stated that cross-cumulation is not only permissible under federal law
and international obligations, but is the preferable position under the
127 GC-E-337, supra note 31; GC-F-186, supra note 31.
128 See, eg., Certain Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, supra note 36.
129 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
130 Commissioner Frank expressly cumulated dumped British imports and subsidized imports
from other countries with subsidized imports from Spain to find injury from the latter in his dissent-
ing opinion in Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from Spain, supra note 79. In addition, it
appears that he may have cross-cumulated in his separate opinion in an earlier determination, where
he stated, "I conclude that there is a reasonable indication that allegedly dumped and/or subsidized
imports... are causing material injury .... " Certain Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom and West Germany, supra note
36.
131 One unanimous opinion stated that the Commission is not required to cross-cumulate and
refused to do so, without further analysis. Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, Canada, India,
and the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1720, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-249, -262 to -265 (Prelim.)
12 (June 1985)(Commission Eckes, however, did not join the discussion regarding cross-cumulation.
Id. at 12 n.38). However, since the Court of International Trade's decision in Bingham & Taylor
Div. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), holding that cross-cumulation is
required under the 1984 Act, this refusal to cross-cumulate appears to have broken down. Commis-
sioners Eckes and Lodwick, at a minimum, are now willing to cross-cumulate. Certain Fresh Cut
Flowers from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, The Nether-
lands, and Peru, USITC Pub. 1877, Inv. Nos. 303-17, -18 (Prelim.), 701-TA-275 to -278 (Prelim.),
731-TA-327 to -334 (Prelim.) 26 n.18 (July 1986)
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1984 Act.
132
Numerous arguments have been presented in support of cross-cu-
mulation. A discussion of the pertinent arguments is set forth below.
(1) The cumulation provision is in the common definitional por-
tion of Title VII relating to material injury1 33 thus the provision is rele-
vant to both antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. This
provision is to be used in both types of investigations and does nothing to
distinguish between the two or to treat them differently.
1 34
(2) Refusing to cross-cumulate would be to read an additional re-
quirement into the statute-that the imports to be cumulated benefit
from the same type of unfair trade practice.
1 35
(3) The language of the original House bill focused on the trad-
ing's impact upon the domestic industry, not the type of unfair practice
involved. 136
(4) The original House Report stated that the purpose of the cu-
mulation provision was "to ensure that the injury test adequately ad-
dresses simultaneous unfair imports from different countries." '137 This
language does not distinguish different types of unfair trade. 131
(5) The injury standards forpreliminary antidumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations do not require the finding of a specific causal
link between the injury and imports resulting from the particular type of
unfair trade under investigation. This suggests that cross-cumulation is
permitted (although not mandated) in preliminary investigations. To in-
terpret the statute as permitting cross-cumulation in preliminary investi-
gations without allowing it in final investigations is illogical and
inconsistent. 139
(6) Under the 1984 Act, the Commerce Department is required to
extend the date of a final subsidy determination to coincide with the date
of a final LTFV determination if the petitioner requests and if the two
investigations are initiated simultaneously and involve imports of the
132 See, ag., GC-I-188, supra note 93; See also GC-H-307, supra note 98, in which the USITC's
legal staff recommended that the Commission cross-cumulate even prior to the effective date of the
1984 Act, based on a perceived congressional mandate.
133 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7).
134 See GC-I-082, supra note 93; GC-I-060, supra note 93.
135 See GC-I-082, supra note 93; GC-I-060, supra note 93.
136 See GC-I-082, supra note 93; GC-I-060, supra note 93.
137 REFORM AcT REPORT, supra note 44, at 37, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5164.
138 See GC-I-060, supra note 93.
139 Id.
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same class or kind of merchandise.140 This provision may have been
designed to give the Commission greater opportunity to cumulate be-
tween investigations, 14 1 however, it may also have been intended to pro-
vide greater administrative efficiency at the Commission.
(7) In investigations where the dumped imports are from
nonmarket economies ("NMEs"), 142 the unfair trade action will natu-
rally resemble a subsidy because of the pervasive pricing control by the
home country government. Indeed, because the Commerce Department
has decided as a matter of law that the countervailing duty statute does
not apply to NMEs,143 the refusal to cross-cumulate might very well hide
a combined impact that otherwise would be cumulated. Dumping from a
NME inevitably involves some government benefit comparable to a sub-
sidy. Therefore, refusal to cross-cumulate is arbitrary, at least with re-
spect to NME imports. 1  However, the Court of International Trade in
Continental Steel Corporation v. United States14 5 recently rejected the
Commerce Department's interpretation of the countervailing duty law as
inapplicable to NMEs. As a result, this argument is no longer valid.
(8) The unfair trade statutes are remedial, not criminal, and
should be interpreted broadly.146 This assumes that a reading of the stat-
ute mandating cross-cumulation is broader than a reading favoring ad-
ministrative discretion.
(9) The effects of the injuries from the two types of unfair trade
practices are identical-lost sales, lower market shares, and lower profits
140 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 606, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1) (amending the 1930 Tariff Act,
§ 705(a)(1)).
141 Petitioners in one investigation may have made this argument, albeit not forcefully. See
USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-031, at n.5 (Feb. 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gem
file).
142 A nonmarket economy is characterized by state central planning and the absence of a market
structure. Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case
and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 218 (1979) [hereinafter State-Con-
trolled-Economy Countries].
143 Potassium Chloride from the German Democratic Republic, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428, 23,429
(1984)(recission of investigation and dismissal of petition); Potassium Chloride from the Soviet
Union, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428, 23,428 (1984)(rescission of investigation and dismissal of petition);
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,376-78 (1984)(final determination);
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370, 19,372-74 (1984)(final determi-
nation). See also Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties: Analysis and A Proposal, 9 LAW &
POL'Y INT'l. Bus 779, 850 (1977).
144 See USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-240 (1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file). See generally State-Controlled-Economy Countries, supra note 142, at 217.
145 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
146 USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-F-345 (Oct. 1982) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm
file)[hereinafter GC-F-345].
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for the domestic industry. 147 This argument, while attractive, proves too
much. Both § 33748 violations and violations of the antitrust laws can
produce the same effects upon domestic industries, yet there has been no
suggestion that these violations should be considered simultaneously
with violations of either the antidumping or countervailing duty laws.
Although identity of effect may suggest that cross-cumulation is appro-
priate, such identification cannot provide an independent basis for a man-
date of cross-cumulation in the absence of identity of cause.
(10) A literal reading of the statutory language requiring that in-
jury be found "by reason of imports of that merchandise"1 49 or "by rea-
son of that merchandise"' 5 ° would prevent cumulation of imports subject
to simultaneous countervailing duty investigations or subject to simulta-
neous antidumping investigations.' This argument requires a more
narrow reading of the federal causal link requirement' 52 than has ever
been seriously proposed for use in practice.
Many arguments in opposition to cross-cumulation have also been
presented. These arguments include those discussed below.
(i) The Commission has never cross-cumulated in the past. 
3
There is no reason to assume that Congress intended to change this con-
sistent practice without explicit direction.' 54 Indeed, Congress does not
appear to have contemplated cross-cumulation.
155
147 Bingham & Taylor Div. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). See infra
notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
148 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
149 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(countervailing duty law).
150 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (antidumping law).
'51 Bingham & Taylor Div., 627 F. Supp. 793.
152 Cf arguments viii & xi in opposition to cross-cumulation, infra text accompanying notes 165-
67 and 172-76.
153 In one case challenging a negative injury determination arising prior to the 1984 Act, "'peti-
tioners conceded at oral argument that no case law compels cumulation between LTFV and subsi-
dized imports and no statute.., appears to mandate such treatment." Gifford-Hill Cement Co., 615
F. Supp. at 590 n.16.
154 Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, supra note 101, at 46 (views of Vice-Chairwoman
Liebeler). This is the first determination decided under the 1984 Act. See GC-I-082, supra note 93;
GC-I-060, supra note 93.
155 Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, supra note 101. There is no evidence in the legisla-
tive history of the 1984 Act that Congress considered the issue of cross-cumulation, although the
issue was raised briefly by one witness during the House hearings:
There also has been some question about cumulation of the same product in separate counter-
vailing duty and antidumping cases. We believe that it would be helpful to amend the statute to
require cumulation in certain circumstances. Such an amendment would help to ensure that
domestic industries are not denied relief because of an unwise exercise of discretion by the
Commission.
Options to Improve. Part 1. supra note 2, at 203 (statement of Dr. Adolph J. Lena).
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(ii) Nothing in the statute directs the Commission to cross-cumu-
late. 156 This argument, unfortunately, begs the issue.
(iii) The antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are
treated in different sections of Title VII, raising a presumption to treat
the two separately. 157 However, these investigations do use the same ba-
sic injury test which arises in the same statutory provisions.
(iv) Two separate unfair acts are involved. For commissioners em-
ploying a margin analysis, 158 this argument may be particularly relevant
as the margins in the two types of investigations require very different
types of computations and standards.
1 59
(v) The statutory timetables for the two types of unfair trade ac-
tions are different. In a countervailing duty case, the Commerce Depart-
ment's preliminary determination must be completed within eighty-five
days, whereas 160 days are allowed for preliminary determinations in
antidumping cases.
[A]ny effort to cumulate allegedly dumped and allegedly subsidized imports
would require the Commission to make a final determination in an an-
tidumping case well before the time it ordinarily would, thereby unfairly
depriving the respondent of vital time in which to present and explain data
and otherwise make its case on the LTFV issue.
6 °
The Commission legal staff disputed the validity of this argument be-
cause of its procedural rather than its substantive bearing upon the issue
of cumulation. 161
(vi) Identification of a home country is much more important in
countervailing duty investigations than in antidumping investigations.
Consequently, cross-cumulation, which would blur national distinctions,
156 Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, Canada, India, and the People's Republic of China,
supra note 131; GC-I-082, supra note 94; GC-I-060, supra note 94.
157 Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, supra note 101, at 46 (views of Vice-Chainvoman
Liebeler).
158 In this context, there are two major approaches to causation analysis. One approach is to
determine whether the unfairly traded imports are injuring a domestic industry. The other is to
determine whether the pricing margin bestowed upon the imports by the unfair trade practice is
injuring the domestic industry. The latter approach is termed "margin analysis." Assume that large
numbers of widgets are entering the country and taking customers away from the domestic widget
industry on the basis of a 20% price advantage. If the unfair trade practice were a 0.5% export
bonus, a commissioner following a margin analysis might find no causation because the unfair benefit
is so minor compared to the fairly-traded competitive advantage. Chairwoman Stern, for one, uses a
margin analysis. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, Korea, and Japan, USITC Pub. 1633,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-215 to -217 (Final) 11-29 (Jan. 1985) (separate views of Chairwoman
Stern)(provides an excellent exegisis of her reasons for using this approach).
159 GC-I-082, supra note 93; GC-I-060, supra note 93.
160 GC-F-034, supra note 124. See also GC-E-337, supra note 32, at n.20.
161 GC-F-034, supra note 124, at n.19. See also GC-E-337, supra note 31, at n.20.
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is totally inappropriate.162
(vii) Commerce determinations under § 705 are country-spe-
cific. 163 Cross-cumulation runs counter to this standard. 164 Note, how-
ever, that this argument would also militate against cumulation in any
countervailing duty investigation involving subsidized imports from
more than one country, even if such cumulation is now expressly
mandated.
(viii) Section 705(b) requires the Commission to make a final de-
termination as to whether the injury is caused "by reason of imports"
which have been found to benefit from a subsidy. 165  Section 735(b)
makes a similar provision for final antidumping determinations. 16 6 This
causal link in the federal law eliminates any possibility of cross-
cumulation. 1
67
(ix) Congress has recognized "technical dumping"' 16 ' but not
"technical subsidization." This establishes that the injury provisions are
not identical 169 and undercuts the argument for cross-cumulation based
upon the identity of the injury standards for the two types of unfair trade
investigations. '
70
(x) Same-country cross-cumulation is not mandated by the stat-
ute. 17 1 Thus, why cross-cumulate in different-country situations if it is
not done in same-country situations? This distinction may have been a
legislative oversight based upon the fact that same-country cumulation
within a countervailing suit neither is automatic nor is even called cumu-
162 GC-F-186, supra note 31. See supra text accompanying note 123.
163 See also H. GREENWAY, TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 88 (1983) (Article
VI of GATT permits discriminatory action "against goods which are dumped by a particular coun-
try .... )
164 GC-F-345, supra note 146.
165 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b).
166 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b).
167 GC-I-082, supra note 93; GC-I-060, supra note 93.
168 The Senate Report on the 1974 Trade Reform Act defines technical dumping as "selling an
imported product at a price which is not lower than that needed to make the product competitive in
the U.S. market, even though the price of the imported product is lower than its home market
price." H.R. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 179, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 7186, 7316.
169 For other differences between the injury provisions under the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws, compare 19 U.S.C. § 167ld(b)(4) with § 1673d(b)(4)(critical circumstances findings); see
also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(7)(E), and (F)(i)(considerations of nature of subsidy in determining threat of
material injury).
17() Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary. Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, supra note 101.
171 The new cumulation provision directs the Commission to "cumulatively assess the volume
and effect of imports from two or more countries .... 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (emphasis added).
For the full text of this new provision, see supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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lation, nor is it the same procedure within an antidumping suit. Yet this
argument at least shows that cross-cumulation was probably not consid-
ered by Congress.
(xi) The Agreement on the GATT Subsidies Code 172 and the par-
allel provision of the Agreement on the Anti-Dumping Code, 173 require
that injuries caused by factors other than the subsidized (or dumped)
imports must not be attributed to the subsidized (or dumped) imports.174
A footnote to this Code provision states that "[s]uch factors can include,
inter alia, the volume and prices of nonsubsidized imports of the product
in question .... 175 Thus, GATT appears to require a causal link. 176
(xii) Greater interference with foreign sovereigns results from im-
posing duties against subsidized goods than against dumped goods, for
the latter are the result of private action only. The former are the result
of a conscious governmental policy. Such interference is most odious
when the subsidy has little or nothing to do with export promotion-
when it is a "domestic subsidy" within the terms of the Subsidies
Code. 177 Cross-cumulation is more likely to produce a finding of injury,
and thus interfere with a foreign sovereign, for reasons only marginally
related to that sovereign's actions.
(xiii) A United States practice of cross-cumulation would provide
a significant disincentive to possible signatories of the GATT Subsidies
Code. Signing the Code would expose a country's exports to the United
States to a risk of countervailing duties because of dumped goods from
third countries.
78
As mentioned above, the staff view is slightly, but definitely, in favor
of cross-cumulation. They have requested that the Commission adopt a
strong and consistent position upon which the various parties may
rely.179 It is ironic, however, that the staff has continued to favor cross-
cumulation even after the Commission had adopted a strong and consis-
tent position against it."80 Of the present Commissioners, Chairwoman
Stern and Vice-Chairwoman Liebeler have written against cross-cumula-
172 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra note 10, at 528.
173 Apr. 12 Agreement on Implementation, supra note 10 at 4927.
174 See GC-F-034.
175 Agreement on Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra note 10 at n.20; Apr. 12 Agreement on
Implementation, supra note 10 at 4927 n.5.
176 GC-F-186, supra note 31.
177 See Agreement on Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, supra note 10, art. 11.
178 Bingham & Taylor Div., 627 F. Supp. at 797-98. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying
text. See also infra text accompanying notes 198-214.
179 GC-H-307, supra note 98; USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-251 (Aug.
1984)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-H-251].
180 GC-I-188, supra note 93; GC-I-082, supra note 93.
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tion explicitly.' Until recently, only Commissioner Frank ever voted
for cross-cumulation.'8 2 Commissioner Calhoun asked for further infor-
mation and advice from the staff and called the issue "very trouble-
some,"' 8 3 but never committed either way on the subject.
In Bingham & Taylor Div. v. United States,184 the Court of Interna-
tional Trade ruled that the 1984 Act requires thi Commission to cross-
cumulate. The court relied upon several arguments raised in favor of
cross-cumulation. With reference made to the arguments listed above,
the court's five arguments were: the lack of an explicit additional require-
ment (2); 185 general congressional concern over simulaneous unfair acts
(4);1 6 the identity of impact of the unfair acts (9); 187 the placement of the
cumulation mandate in the common definitional section of the statute
(1); 18 and, the dangers of a literal reading of the statutory requirement
for a causal link (10).189 The court rejected arguments based upon: con-
tinuing past practice in the face of congressional silence (i);' 9 0 the statu-
tory causal link requirement (viii);' 9' United States international
obligations (iii); 192 the need to encourage countries to sign the Subsidies
Code (xiii); 193 and differing aspects of the injury investigation provisions
(ix).94 None of the other arguments presented above, on either side of
this debate, appear to have entered into the court's decision. The Com-
mission has appealed Bingham to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. 1
95
Based upon the considerations set forth above, the 1984 Act should
not be construed to require cross-cumulation. The most persuasive argu-
ments are those relating to the causal link requirement in GATT (xi) and
the federal law (viii) and interference with a foreign sovereign (xii). The
181 Certain Carbon Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, supra note 101, at 43-44 (views of Vice-Chairwo-
man Liebeler).
182 Certain Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Romania, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, supra note 36.
183 GC-I-082, supra note 93, at n. 19 (citing Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Brazil, Belgium, France,
and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1230, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-148 to -150 (Prelim.) (1982)).
184 627 F. Supp. at 793.
185 Id. at 794.
186 Id. at 796.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 797.
189 Id. at 798.
190 Id. at 794.
191 Id. at 795.
192 Id. at 796.
193 Id. at 797-98.
194 Id. at 798.
195 No. 86-1440 (Fed. Cir. filed July 8, 1986).
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statutory structure argument (1) is the strongest point in favor of cross-
cumulation. The congressional message is ambiguous at best (compare
(2),(3), and (4) with (i) and (x)), suggesting that any change such as
cross-cumulation, which might significantly alter the injury test causal
link requirements and conflict with internal economic obligations and re-
lations, should be more clearly mandated by Congress. A change in a
long-standing administrative practice, especially one in which interna-
tional political significance may eclipse the economic consequences,
should not be presumed from congressional silence and lack of considera-
tion of the issue.
Consistent with these concerns, the general congressional desire to
protect domestic industries should be respected whenever possible. For
that reason, the Commission should, as an administrative matter, under-
take cross-cumulation of goods coming from the same country in both
subsidized and dumped formats.196 Since these would be single-source
imports, there would not be the potential for international claims of in-
terference with a foreign sovereign through penalizing that sovereign for
the actions of third countries or exporters in third countries. Where im-
ports under investigation from one country are dumped and those from
another are subsidized, however, the Commission should consider the
subsidized and dumped imports separately under the competitive factors
approach 197 as market factors may weaken the domestic industry and
make it more prone to injury from either set of unfair imports.
E. Cumulation with Section 303 Countervailing Duty Statistics
From time to time the Commission has been asked to cumulate im-
port statistics from § 303 countervailing duty investigations into ongoing
§ 701 investigations.198 Section 303 provides for an injury test only with
respect to otherwise duty-free imports from non-GATT countries to
196 The new cumulation provision limits mandatory cumulation to situations involving two or
more countries. See supra note 171. This should not prevent the Commission from exercising its
discretion to cumulate where imports from only one country are involved. Naturally, if the same
imports are both subsidized and sold at LTFV, the statistics for those imports should not be double-
counted under any spurious cumulation analysis.
197 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Potassium Chloride from Israel and Spain, USITC Pub. 1596, Inv. Nos. 303-TA-15,
701-TA-213 (Final) at A-2 n.4 (Nov.1984) ("Petitioners urged the Commission to cumulate the
market shares of Israel [receiving an injury test under § 303(a)(2)], Spain [receiving an injury test
under § 701], East Germany [receiving no injury test under § 303(a)(2)], and the U.S.S.R. [receiving
no injury test under § 303(a)(2)] in all statistical analyses."); see also Certain Fresh Cut Flowers
from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and
Peru, supra note 131, at 26 n. 18; Potassium Chloride from East Germany, Israel, Spain, and the
U.K., USITC Pub. 1529 Inv. Nos. 303-TA-15, 701-TA-213 (Prelim.), 731-TA-181 to -187 (Prelim.)
(May 1984).
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which the United States has obligated itself, by treaty or otherwise, to
provide an injury test.' 99 Unless such an international agreement exists,
§ 303 provides for compensatory duties after a Commerce Department
finding of a bounty or grant 200  without any Commission injury
investigation.2o'
1. Imports not Receiving Injury Determinations under Section 303
The Commission legal staff has repeatedly encouraged the Commis-
sion to cumulate statistics from noninjury-test imports under investiga-
tion by the Commerce Department pursuant to § 303(a) into
investigations arising under § 701, the countervailing duty law for
GATT-source imports.202 One commissioner has cumulated statistics
from noninjury-test investigations in the past.20 3 Recently, a majority of
the Commission has voted to cumulate statistics from § 303(a) investiga-
tions into an ongoing § 701 investigation.20 4 Such cumulation is inappro-
priate for several reasons.
First, such cumulation allocates to GATT countries injury caused
by non-GATT countries. This is the clearest case of holding one party
liable for the injury caused by a group of parties. This is improper. In
part, such a position defeats the advantages of joining GATT and, in so
doing, discourages nonmember countries from joining GATT.2 °5
Second, to cumulate noninjury-test statistics would be to require the
Commission to consider injury from Alpha and Beta together without
ever considering injury from Alpha alone. The Alpha imports may not
be injurious, yet, by inflating the statistics under Commission considera-
tion, they may contribute to an injury finding against Beta.20 6
Third, the cumulation provision does not apply to § 303, as § 303 is
not within the list of material injury sections referred to in
199 Tariff Act of 1930 § 303(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2).
200 These terms are essentially identical to the term "subsidy" used in §§ 701-06, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-76.
201 Tariff Act of 1930 § 303(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1).
202 See USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-051 (Mar. 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library,
Gcm file)[hereinafter GC-I-051]; GC-H-251, supra note 179; GC-F-034, supra note 124.
203 Chairwoman Stern has so cumulated. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Austria,
Romania, and Venezuela, supra note 53; Certain Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Spain, USITC Pub.
1544, Inv. No. 701-TA-209 (Final) 8 n.21 (June 1984).
204 Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel.
Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Peru, supra note 131, at 26 n. 18.
205 "[I]t may serve to undermine the benefit [of signing the Subsidies Code]." GC-I-060, supra
note 93, at n.33.
206 Respondents, in one investigation, contended that including imports from non-signatories de-
nied the respondents their own injury test. USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-084 (Mar.
1984)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file).
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§ 1677(7)(B).20 7 Congress could have easily added an instruction to con-
sider these noninjury test statistics if it desired. This objection is not a
problem in cross-cumulation analysis, because the "subject to investiga-
tion" language might be read to include both antidumping and con-
tervailing duty investigations, thus permitting cross-cumulation.2"8
Section 303 does not appear within Title VII, where the new cumulation
provision appears; z09 therefore, it is questionable that the cumulation
term "investigation" includes a Commerce Department investigation
without any Commission investigation.2"'
Despite these arguments, domestic industries are validly concerned
with the impact of multiple source imports.2" Whether certain imports
are entitled to an injury test under domestic law is irrelevant to the fact
that the imports may actually be injuring domestic industries. The ham-
mering effect will continue to occur regardless of Commission
investigations.
There is no risk that a non-GATT country not receiving an injury
test under a § 303 investigation could escape compensatory duties due
because of a Commission failure to cumulate. The lack of an injury test
207 See supra note 37.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 122-208.
209 The Commission's legal staff has argued that limiting cumulation to Title VII investigations
without express Congressional authority is unwarranted. USITC General Counsel Memorandum
GC-I-060, supra note 93. The staff may be correct on this point. However, limiting the cumulation
mandate of the 1984 Act to Title VII investigations is warranted and within the clear terms of the
statute.
210 Indeed, it could be argued that such an action would be totally beyond the Commission's
authority. See id. Despite the fact that § 303 does not even appear within Title VII, a majority of
the Commission recently stated that "[we] note that imports from [three countries whose import
statistics were being cumulated into a countervailing duty injury investigation] are not subject to
injury investigations before the Commission. However, the statute does not require that imports be
subject to an injury investigation for cumulation to be required." Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Peru,
supra note 131, at 26 n. 18 (July 1986) (emphasis in original). Such a conclusion is dangerously
broad. Would any investigation of imports, by any federal agency, open the door to cumulation in
countervailing duty or antidumping duty injury investigations before the Commission?
211 The Commission legal staff has raised one argument in favor of cumulating § 303 investiga-
tion statistics into a § 701 injury investigation in the special instance where a § 731 investigation
against the same imports from the same countries is also ongoing. Failure to cumulate § 303 statis-
tics with § 701 statistics could lead to a negative finding in the § 701 investigation. This result
might be inconsistent with the results in the § 731 investigation against those same imports, where
the Commission would have cumulated the import statistics. See id. While this "inconsistency"
might arise, it is not of great moment. For the § 701 investigation to result in a negative injury
determination, and the § 731 investigation regarding those same imports to have resulted in a posi-
tive injury determination, it is apparent that those imports could have been no more than a minor
contributing factor in causing injury to the domestic industry. The imposition of dumping duties as
a result of the § 731 determination should then suffice to restore this trade to a sufficiently fair basis
to prevent further injury to the domestic industry.
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for such imports protects against such a result. However, some protec-
tion is needed to ensure that offending GATT imports do not escape
compensatory duties because of the essentially irrelevant fact that the
other imports are from non-GATT countries.
The answer, once again, is to consider the non-GATT imports
under the competitive factors approach, as factors in the marketplace
weakening the domestic industry.2 12 In this way, other imports could be
considered as factors in the domestic marketplace which increase the
likelihood that the imports under investigation by the Commission have
injured or will injure the domestic industry.
2. Imports Receiving Injury Determinations under Section 303
Imports accorded an injury test under § 303(a)(2) are more appro-
priate for cumulation than those that are not, as the former are subject to
a Commission investigation arising under Title VII.21 3 Whether cumula-
tion is appropriate here will be determined by the kind of trade action
into which the § 303(a)(2) imports are to be cumulated. If the injury
investigation into which these § 303(a)(2) imports are to be cumulated is
a countervailing action, then cumulation is appropriate. If, however, it is
an antidumping action, then a competitive factors approach should be
used. This is consistent with this Article's conclusion that cross-cumula-
tion is not appropriate, but that a competitive factors approach may be
used in its place.2 14
F. Cumulation with Negative Injury Determinations
The Commission has, on occasion, been asked to cumulate statistics
relating to imports no longer under investigation and subject to a recent
negative injury determination into a new injury investigation.21 5 The
logic of the petitioners has been that the earlier case did not consider
every factor cumulatively, but considered only the one source in isola-
tion.2 16 Normally, the Commission should refuse to cumulate in such a
situation, even though the Commerce Department found an unfair trade
212 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
213 In 1979, Congress amended § 303 by, inter alia, incorporating by reference Title VII with
respect to any Commission injury investigations under § 303(a)(2). Trade Agreements Act of 1979
§ 103(b). However, the new cumulation provision contains no such cross-reference to § 303. Hence.
noninjury-test countervailing duty investigations are not relevant to a cumulation analysis by the
Commission.
214 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from the United Kingdom, supra note 116.
216 See id.
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practice in the previous investigation.21 7 Naturally, if a sufficiently long
time has elapsed since the negative determination, the situation would be
as if there had been no finding at all and the domestic industry had never
filed any prior petition with regard to the imports.
When a new petition is filed with respect to the previous source,
alleging either changed circumstances in the industry or a new opportu-
nity to cumulate as a result of the passage of the 1984 Act,218 the Com-
mission is faced with a difficult choice. If the Commission cumulates, it
invites future duplicative procedures. Indeed, the staff recognized the
risk of repetitive filings when it urged the Commission to apply the cu-
mulation terms of the 1984 Act even before the Act's effective date.219
If the Commission fails to cumulate, it might reach a faulty, or lop-
sided, substantive result, one that fails to protect fully a domestic indus-
try which may be suffering material injury. For that reason, the Com-
mission has reconsidered and cumulated imports which received negative
217 Obviously, if the previous investigation was terminated because there was a negative finding
by the Commerce Department as to the existence of any unfair trade practice, then no cumulation
would be proper at all (but not for "subject to investigation" reasons).
218 See e.g., Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Canada, and Taiwan, supra note 47
(reasonable indication of material injury found from allegedly dumped imports from Argentina,
under the 1984 Act). Argentina had been the subject of a negative injury determination in an inves-
tigation conducted prior to the 1984 Act. Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Brazil, Ko-
rea, Mexico, and Japan, USITC Pub. 1555, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-215 to -217 (Prelim.), 731-TA-191 to -
195 (Prelim.)(July 1984).
Petitioners have brought virtually the same case as their previous one on the grounds that the
Trade and TariffAct of 1984 has changed the law on cumulation. Since the Commission elected
not to consider Argentina for cumulation in the prior case, petitioners argue in this investiga-
tion that the Commission should reconsider Argentina within the context of the new statute.
Petitioners do allege new facts, however ....
USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-176 (Aug. 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gem
file)[hereinafter GC-I-176]. Compare Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan, supra note 47, (affirmative preliminary injury determination with respect to
allegedly dumped Brazilian imports, under the 1984 Act) with Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from
Brazil, USITC Pub. 1681, Inv. No. 701-TA-221 (Final)(Apr. 1985)(negative injury determination
with respect to Brazilian imports, not cumulated, in a pre-1984 Act determination).
219 See USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-004 (Jan. 1985) (LEXIS, Itrade library,
Gem file); USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-297 (Oct. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library,
Gem file):
Although the new cumulation provision does not apply.., we recommend that the Commis-
sion make its determination as to whether or not to cumulate based on the criteria set forth in
the Act. Were the Commission to follow its prior decisions on cumulation, and decide not to
cumulate based on the traditional criteria, petitioners could simply file a new petition. In any
such investigation, the Commission would be required to apply the provisions of the new law.
Knowing this, we conclude that it would be a waste of the Commission's resources to fail to
apply the criteria of the new law in this case.
But see USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-078 (May 1985)(LEXIS, Itrade library, Gem
file).
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injury determinations just prior to the 1984 Act.220
This policy may have been acceptable during the transition to the
1984 Act. In the long run, however, a willingness to reconsider recent
negative determinations absent a showing of changes in the industry or
the marketplace would be an adverse development. Such willingness
would result in piecemeal determinations, raise costs for both sides as
well as the taxpayer, produce uncertainty of substantive result for a suc-
cessful importer, 221 and require general administrative duplication of
efforts.
A domestic industry should have no difficulty filing a new petition
following a prior negative determination where changed circumstances
exist that would present the Commerce Department or the Commission
with a significantly altered investigation. Presumably the passage of a
specified time-two or three years-would provide aprimafacie showing
of changed circumstances. However, the filing of a new petition follow-
ing a negative injury determination under the 1984 Act should not be
permitted merely because cumulation of statistics relating to additional
respondents is now sought when those respondents could easily have
been named in the original petition. Without this limitation, Commis-
sion time is wasted, domestic diligence is not encouraged, and importers
previously successful before the Commission would be subject to harass-
ing actions. Changed circumstances would include the existence of a
new and significant market entrant, but would not include naming as
new respondents previous market participants or previously successful
respondents. Such a limitation on the refiling of petitions would proba-
bly lie with Congress, not the Commission.
V. CUMULATION OF DE MINIMIS IMPORTS
Prior to the passage of the 1984 Act, the Commission sometimes
found unfair imports noninjurious and not appropriate for cumulation
because the imports were de minimis in volume. 222 With the passage of
the 1984 Act, however, the staff and most of the Commission now believe
220 See supra note 218.
221 Resjudicata applies to Commission determinations, but is easily overcome by a showing of
"new facts" in the marketplace or industry under investigation. See GC-I-176, supra note 218.
222 See, e.g., Titanium Sponge from Japan and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 1600. Inv. Nos.
731-TA-161, -162 (Final) (Nov. 1984)(United Kingdom imports "insignificant" except for successful
GSA bids, not cumulated); Certain Steel Wire Nails from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Yugo-
slavia, USITC Pub. 1175, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-45 to -47 (Prelim.)(Aug. 1981)(Yugoslavian imports'
market share "insignificant [at] 1 or 2 percent of apparent U.S. consumption," not cumulated); but
see GC-H-133, supra note 89 (Certain Steel Wire Nails from Japan, the The Republic of Korea. and
Yugoslavia also rested on fact that the Yugoslavian nails were of inferior quality).
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that a de minimis exception is no longer possible where there is at least
one non-de minimis source into which to cumulate the smaller source.z23
Whether this position is required or even advisable is the topic of this
portion of the Article.
There are three basic grounds for the de minimis exception. The
first ground concerns the causal link requirement in both GATT and the
wording of the domestic law.224 If imports from a source are sufficiently
low as to be termed de minimis, it is difficult to see how any injury could
have been caused by those imports.2 5 A second ground is the concern
for efficient use of administrative resources, both by the Commission and
the Customs Service, the enforcement agency."2 6 Third, an injury finding
against de minimis imports could disrupt trade and trade relations with-
out any corresponding economic benefit to a domestic industry.22 7
Whether imports were found to be de minimis was almost entirely
the result of considering import volume and trends and the percentage
that volume represented of apparent domestic consumption.2 2 8 This
formed the first element of the old market analysis approach to cumula-
tion. 22 9 Following passage of the 1984 Act, the staff concluded that vol-
ume (and volume trend) could not be considered in deciding whether to
cumulate.230 The staff derived its conclusion from the legislative history
223 See Certain Carbon Steel Product from Austria, Czechoslavakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Venezuela, supra note 101 (Chairwoman Stem, Commis-
sioners Eckes and Rohr); Cf. id. at 52 (Vice-Chairwoman Liebeler). See also GC-I-060, supra note
93; GC-I-018, supra note 41.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 9-14, 172-76.
225 "In such situations, the linkage between imports and injury is based only on speculation."
USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-H-095 (Mar. 1984) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Gcm file).
For an extreme example, arising after the effective date of the 1984 act, consider the Commission's
refusal to cumulate Yugoslavian welded carbon steel line pipes in Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes
and Tubes from India, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, supra note 47. The refusal arose from the
fact that there had been no such imports for three years. In GC-I-051, supra note 202, the Staff
recommended against inclusion of France in a cumulative analysis, where there had been no imports
for ten months. They did so not on a de minimis theory, however, but on the grounds that the
French imports were not "reasonably coincident" with the other imports. See also Certain Steel
Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany, supra note 36.
226 GC-H-133, supra note 89.
227 Id.
228 See, e.g., Titanium Sponge From Japan and the United Kingdom, supra note 222 (Fi-
nal)(Nov.1984); Certain Steel Products from Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom and West Germany, supra note 36 (Commissioner
Frank objecting to a uniform definition of what constitutes a de mininis volume despite differences
in industries); Certain Steel Wire Nails from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Yugoslavia. supra
note 72.
229 See stpra text accompanying notes 34-36.
230 See GC-I-060, supra note 94; GC-I-018, supra note 41.
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in which Congress eliminated "contributing cause" as one criterion for
cumulation.23' The staff interpreted this rejection as prohibiting any
consideration of volume and volume trend on an individual country basis
when determining whether to cumulate.232 The majority of the present
commissioners have fully accepted this staff position23 3 and believe that it
is now impossible to apply a de minimis test before cumulating.234
An example of how the Commission has approached miniscule im-
ports in one case under the 1984 Act will illustrate the absurdity of this
analysis. In Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From Thai-
land and Venezuela,235 the Comission faced the latest in a long series of
investigations with respect to the welded carbon steel pipe and tube in-
dustry.236 In this particular investigation, the commissioners all felt con-
strained to cumulate Thai import statistics with statistics regarding like
imports from Venezuela. What makes this position noteworthy is that
the Thai imports comprised less than 0.05% of the United States mar-
ket.237 In fact, out of a total import value from all countries of approxi-
mately $575 million in 1984, these Thai imports were worth only
231 The original House bill, H.R. 4784, explicitly utilized the contributing cause standard in
§ 104(a)(2). See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 98TH
CONG., 2D SESS. 26 (Comm. Print 1984). This was rejected by the entire Ways and Means Commit-
tee, however: "The requirement in the bill as introduced that imports from each country have a
"contributing effect' in causing material injury would have precluded cumulation in cases where the
impact of imports from each source treated individually is minimal but the combined impact is
injurious." REFORM AcT REPORT, supra note 44, at 37, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5164. The Senate version of the House bill into which H.R. 4784 was merged, H.R. 3398, reintro-
duced the contributing cause standard in § 703. Finally, the language adopted by the Ways and
Means Committee was reinstated in Conference. H.R. REP. No. 1156, supra note 45, at 173, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwVS at 5290. This language went on to enactment.
232 See,e.g., USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-I-040 (Mar. 1985) (LEXIS, Itrade li-
brary, Gcm file); GC-I-018, supra note 41.
233 Certain Carbon Steel Product from Austria, Czechoslavakia, East Germany, Hungary, Nor-
way, Poland Romana, Sweden and Venezuela, supra note 101, at 12 (Chairwoman Stem, Commis-
sioners Eckes and Rohr).
234 This must be distinguished from the application of a de minimis test before cumulating. Once
cumulated, there is no longer even a perceived problem with looking at volume. Vice-Chairman
Liebeler utilizes an explicit de mimimis standard of 2.5% of apparent domestic consumption at this
latter phase. Her analysis is contingent upon certain assumptions as to elasticity in the industry
under investigation. For the fullest analysis, see her views in Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and
Tubes From Thailand and Venezuela, supra note 84. In fact, Vice-Chairman Liebler has suggested
that the new cumulation mandate includes an implicit Congressional acceptance of a de minimis
standard. "It is precisely because Congress was aware that certain levels of imports were insufficient
to satisfy the causation standard that Congress required a summation of imports across nations in
certain cases." Id. Her views on a general de ininimis exception are of considerable interest, but are
beyond the scope of this article.
235 Supra note 84.
236 Id. at 7 n.8.
237 Id. at A-33 (Table 16).
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$15,000.38 With a dumping margin calculated at 21.1% to 40.7%,239
dumping duties on such a volume of Thai imports would have amounted
to less than $6,100.
Should the congressional rejection of a "contributing cause" stan-
dard necessarily result in the Commission rejecting a de minimis stan-
dard prior to cumulation? The rejection of the contributing cause
standard does indicate a decision by Congress not to allow administrative
efficiency to be a basis for rejecting cumulation. However, it cannot be
seen as a rejection of the causal link requirement already embodied in the
federal law and in GATT.
The rejection of this approach leads to the possibility of a stream-
lined de minimis analysis. Perhaps the Commission should no longer
undertake a de minimis analysis prior to cumulation unless the importers
seeking to avoid cumulation of their imports with those of other coun-
tries allege and prove that the required causal link to domestic injury is
lacking. Such proof could, for example, consist of a demonstration that
the importer's few sales acted merely to expand the market's customer
base, rather than to displace domestic sales. Under this approach the
new statutory language could be construed as shifting the burdens of go-
ing forward and persuasion with respect to a precumulation de minimis
argument.
Another approach would be to recognize that imports which have a
very low volume and which have captured a very small percentage of
apparent domestic consumption may be inappropriate for cumulation be-
cause they do not compete in the marketplace in any meaningful way.
These imports would fail to meet the first element of the cumulation
standards proposed by either the staff or this Article under the 1984
Act. z40 It is unclear what evidence must be adduced to justify excluding
imports in such a manner, but situations might arise.
24 1
VI. PROPOSALS
As a result of the analysis of cumulation law and practice carried
out earlier in this Article, certain proposals may now be made.
1) The Commission should adopt the two-part test for cumulation
now used by Commissioner Liebeler: mutual competition and "subject to
investigation." Reasonably coincident marketing should be considered
238 Id. at A-30 (Table 14).
239 Id. at A-5.
240 Cf. supra notes 39, 41.
241 See Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugosla-
via, vupra note 47 (views of Commissioner Lodwick on imports from Turkey).
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as an element of the competition aspect of the cumulation test.242
2) The Commission should interpret "subject to investigation" as
referring to overlapping periods of investigation. The Commission
should not interpret "subject to investigation" as Commissioner Liebeler
interprets the phrase, requiring that all imports to be cumulated be under
active investigation as of the precise date determination is to be made.
Nor should the Commission interpret "subject to investigation" as per-
mitting cumulation of statistics from all past affirmative determinations
within an arbitrary time period prior to the instant determination date, as
do the rest of the commissioners.243
3) Where only a partial overlap exists, and a final affirmative find-
ing is made as to one country on the basis of cumulation of imports from
another country which may finally receive a negative determination, the
Commission should provide an alternate causal analysis, not utilizing cu-
mulation. This would obviate the need for a § 751 review, as the case
would be fit for summary judgment in the Court of International Trade if
no injury would have been found but for the cumulation. In the alterna-
tive, if an injury were found even without cumulation, there would be no
basis for a successful challenge or demand for reconsideration.
2 1
4) Where the domestic industry continues to feel injury from prior
imports subject to a past affirmative final injury determination, the Com-
mission should use the competitive factors approach. The old injury, and
the degree to which the domestic industry has recovered from it, should
be considered as factors of competition in the domestic marketplace. In
this context, material injury (and threat thereof) should be interpreted to
include suppression of the recovery (or threat of suppression of the re-
covery) of the domestic industry.245
5) The Commission should not adopt a general cross-cumulation
analysis. Rather, LTFV imports should be considered as weakening the
domestic industry for the onslaught of subsidized imports and, vice
versa, under the competitive factors approach.246
6) Where imports from a single country include items supported
by subsidies as well as other items being sold at LTFV, the Commission
should exercise its discretion to cumulate the statistics from these two
sets of imports, but should not count twice statistics relating to any im-
242 See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. The staff's "'cash deposit" analysis is similar
to, though less satisfactory, than this suggested approach.
244 See supra note 89.
245 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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ports receiving both kinds of unfair trade advantage.2 47
7) Where the Commission is asked to cumulate statistics from sub-
sidized imports being investigated by either the Commerce Department
or the Commission under § 303 into a § 701 or § 731 investigation, the
Commission should refuse. Instead, the Commission should utilize the
competitive factors approach.24
8) If the Commission chooses to adopt the principle of cross-cu-
mulation, then it should be limited to those types of investigations utiliz-
ing a Title VII injury test: § 731 antidumping investigations, § 701
countervailing duty investigations, and § 303(a)(2) countervailing duty
investigations with respect to duty-free imports from countries with
which the United States has undertaken to afford an injury determina-
tion. Apart from these situations, the competitive factors approach
should be used.24 9
9) A de minimis test should be applied to import volume statistics
even prior to the decision to cumulate. However, only a very low level of
import penetration and share of domestic consumption should be consid-
ered de minimis. In this way, the causal link requirements in GATT and
the federal law may be satisfied. Furthermore, the burden of showing
that the imports caused no injury to the domestic industry would be
placed on the importers before noncumulation is permitted. Only if the
lack of a causal link to domestic injury is established should particular
imports be removed from the cumulative analysis. In the alternative, a
de minimis level of competition could lead to a refusal to cumulate.25
These proposals would, if adopted, go far in making unfair trade
practice laws more responsive to both domestic needs and international
obligations.
247 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 122-97.
249 See supra text accompanying notes 122-224.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 222-41.
